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11. Author’s Background and Qualifications
With his degree in electrical engineering and computer science, Noel Runyan has been 
working in human-factors engineering for more than 36 years, primarily developing 
access technologies for helping people with visual impairments use computers and 
other electronic devices. 
During the five years he worked for IBM, he was involved in the design and testing of 
the security systems for both Bay Area Rapid Transit ticket machines and ATM credit card 
systems.
After starting his own company to supply access technologies, he designed and 
manufactured the Audapter speech synthesizer to enable computers to talk to users 
with visual impairments. He also authored the EasyScan, BuckScan and PicTac programs, 
which made it easier for users with visual impairments to read print books, identify 
dollar bills and convert print pictures into raised-line tactile drawings.
To help their customers with visual impairments access and make use of computer 
systems, the author and his wife, Deborah, have built more than 500 custom-integrated 
personal computers with speech, braille and/or large-print interfaces. 
More recently, he has been involved in the development of talking Internet radios, 
talking pill bottles and other medical equipment for people who have difficulty reading 
print labels and displays.
For several years, the author has been studying and testing the accessibility features 
and usability of all the major voting systems used in this country. He has tested the 
systems actually delivered by the manufacturers, rather than the possible future systems 
promised by some of the manufacturers.
He has worked with the Santa Clara County (Calif.) Voter Access Advisory Committee, 
voting rights advocates and manufacturers to make voting systems more accessible for 
all voters with disabilities or special language needs. In addition to donating his time 
as a voting systems consultant, he has given testimony as an expert witness in six court 
cases. In each, he challenged the shoddy access features of many of the voting systems 
and pressed for meaningful rather than mere token accessibility.
The author has never received any form of financial compensation from any of the 
voting system vendors.
2. Acknowledgements
This report was made possible by the support of VoterAction.org. Common Cause and 
Demos also contributed to the release of this report. 
The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the tremendous contribution of Deborah 
Runyan as researcher, sounding board and main editor for this report, as well as input 
and feedback from Roger Petersen.
23. Executive Summary
3.1 The Need for Accessible Voting Systems
Basic demographic data reveal much about the need for better access to the voting 
process.
Studies have shown that 20% of the population of the U.S. has one or more disabilities 
and that approximately 10% of that number live with severe disabilities and that about 
20% of U.S. adults with disabilities — more than 8 million potential voters — say they 
have been unable to vote in presidential or congressional elections due to barriers at or 
getting to the polls. 
3.2 Current Law Requires Accessible Voting Systems
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requires that all polling places in elections for federal 
office anywhere in the United States have at least one voting system that shall “be 
accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind 
and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and 
participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters
3.3 Most Currently Deployed Voting Systems Are Not Really Accessible
Most currently deployed voting systems, including direct-recording electronic (DRE) 
systems, do not meet current HAVA and ADA disability accommodation requirements, 
and they are far from compliance with the new Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. 
They are not accessible for significant numbers of individuals with disabilities for at least 
the following reasons: 
The lack of a dual-switch input control interface for voters with severe manual 
dexterity disabilities who are unable to use touch screens or tactile key inputs.
The inadequacy of most of the systems’ audio access features for voters who are 
blind or have low vision, cognitive impairments, severe motor impairments or 
dyslexia. 
The lack of simultaneous and synchronized audio and visual outputs. These 
systems are inaccessible to many voters with visual impairments. 
The lack of voter-adjustable magnification, contrast and display color settings 
that can improve the readability of text on the video displays.
The confusing menu selection systems that are difficult for people with 
cognitive disabilities to use effectively.
Almost all of the systems’ blatant lack of adequate privacy curtains to prevent 
eavesdroppers from reading the voters’ selections on their visual displays. 
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3The systems’ lack of capability to allow voters with disabilities to select for 
themselves different access modes or features without intervention from poll 
workers.
Lack of proper boosted audio output levels for voters with hearing impairments.
The inadequate tactile control keypads on most of the systems.
The requirement, on some electronic voting systems, for voters to manually 
handle paper ballots or voter ID cards, which may make it difficult or impossible 
for some voters with severe manual dexterity impairments to complete the 
voting process independently.
The verification of the voter-verifiable paper and audit trails (VVPAT) on the 
systems is inaccessible to many voters with visual or motor impairments and 
voters with special language needs.
In other words, a significant portion of citizens with disabilities or special language 
needs who attempt to cast their votes on these poorly designed voting machines will be 
unable to do so privately and independently. 
3.4 Recommendations to Make Voting Systems Accessible
The following is a set of recommendations that should make the next generation 
of voting systems more accessible. A major redesign and simplification of all voting 
systems and their components will also make blends of voting systems more practical 
for election officials, poll workers and voters. 
3.4.1 Use Blended Systems
There will never be a single perfect voting machine that meets everyone’s accessible-
voting needs. The best currently available solution to meet security and accessibility 
needs is a blended combination or mix that would include most of the following:
Optical-scan ballots and precinct scanners.
Ballot-on-demand printers.
Bilingual paper ballots.
Electronic ballot-marking devices (BMD) with accessible paper ballot 
scan/verification.
Tactile ballots with verification wands (if properly designed and produced with 
good quality) for accessible absentee and deaf-blind voting.
Simple digital electronic magnifier aids for the polling place.
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43.4.2 Adopt Bilingual Ballot Systems
Bilingual paper ballot or bilingual VVPAT systems can facilitate preferred-language 
voting, prevent many security and privacy exposures and assure that the audit 
trail can be read in English. To support alternative language needs, precinct-count 
optical scanners and other voting machines should also include international icons or 
multilingual labels and displays.
3.4.3 Adopt Ballot-on-Demand Printing Systems
Ballot-on-demand printing with special ballot paper and standard printers will reduce 
the costs of paper ballots, assure a reliable and steady supply of multilingual ballots, and 
prevent waste of surplus ballots. 
3.4.4 Do More to Create Privacy in the Polling Place
All paper ballot printing, scanning and verifying systems should support and be 
supplied with ballot privacy sleeves to help assure vote privacy.
Voting booths need much better privacy shields and curtains, and poll workers need to 
be more careful about how they set up and orient the screens and printers in the polling 
place.
3.4.5 Improve Accessibility Interfaces on Voting Systems
Despite the VVSG’s more explicit standards for better accessibility features and 
functions, many vendors have not yet managed to deliver dual-switch input controls, 
simultaneous audio-video output, enhanced video display controls, and other essential 
and manageable improvements to their voting machine accessibility. Additionally, 
voting aids should be provided at the polling place, such as handheld lenses or 
electronic video magnifiers to assist voters with low vision. Tactile ballot marking 
systems can be used to accommodate voters who are deaf-blind. Ballot boxes and 
precinct optical scanners should have input slots with legroom below to accommodate 
voters in wheelchairs. PCOS scanners should also include international icons or 
multilingual labels and displays.
Electronic BMDs (including former DREs converted to BMDs with ballot printers) should 
include a voter-selectable control option to automatically deposit the printed ballot into 
a ballot box or drawer without requiring manual handling by the voter.
3.5 Conclusions
The technology for inexpensively providing good accessibility to voting systems has 
been commonly available for more than a decade, and it can and should be applied to 
all modern voting systems.
5A completely new and redesigned generation of voting systems is needed. To 
accommodate a broad range of disability access needs, voting systems must be 
designed, from the beginning, with security, accessibility and good human factors in 
mind. 
It is not likely that any single voting machine design can ever meet all the complex and 
sometimes contradictory needs and requirements of all voters.
Hybrid DRE-VVPAT designs and their accessibility Band-Aids should be phased out 
entirely. Adding VVPAT roll printers to currently fielded DREs will necessitate later having 
to tack on an awkward scanner-verifier capability to make verification of the printout 
even partly accessible. 
If counties insist on making some use of their current DRE systems, they should not 
attempt to add tourniquets such as VVPAT roll-to-roll printers. 
Converting DREs to BMDs by only adding cheap cut-sheet printers without verification 
scanner capabilities may become widespread but would result in unacceptable systems 
with major ballot-handling privacy exposures, as well as systems without reliably 
accessible paper ballot verification.
DRE systems already in the field should only be used if: 
They incorporate an accessible and truly verifiable paper ballot printer/scanner/
verifier that converts them into more reliable ballot marking devices.
Their accessibility is substantially improved to fully comply with all the new 
VVSG accessibility requirements.
Blended systems with optical-scan ballots, precinct scanners and accessible BMDs 
similar to the AutoMARK, such as now used in New Mexico, are the best and most likely 
solution for the foreseeable future. 
1.
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64. Introduction
For many voters with disabilities, the passing of the Help America Vote Act held 
tremendous hope and promise for secure and reliable voting, a guarantee that every 
voter would have access to the voting process. 
4.1 Why are Special Voting Systems With Access for Voters With 
Disabilities Needed? 
Basic demographic data reveal much about the need for better access to the voting 
process.
Various studies, including those issued by the International Center for Disability 
Information and the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, 
indicate that 20% of the population of the U.S. have one or more disabilities and that 
approximately 10% of that number live with severe disabilities. 
A September 2004 poll by Harris Interactive for a study by the National Organization on 
Disability (NOD) found the following:
About 20% of U.S. adults with disabilities — more than 8 million potential voters — say 
they have been unable to vote in presidential or congressional elections due to barriers 
at or getting to the polls. 
Of the roughly one-fifth of U.S. adults with disabilities who said they wanted to vote but 
were not able to:
29% said they could not get accessible transportation.
22% said their eligibility had been challenged.
21% reported that the polling place was not accessible.
21% reported that their mental or physical abilities were questioned.
19% said they could not understand the voting machine.
18% said they were made to feel embarrassed or uncomfortable.
12% reported that they needed alternative voting formats (large-print ballots, 
computer-assisted voting booths, paper ballots, etc.) that were not available.
12% said they needed assistance (such as a sign-language interpreter) that was 
not available.
8% said they were not allowed to have someone help them with the voting 
machine.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
7Additionally, 21% said they did not know how to register, in spite of legal requirements 
that those who provide services to people with disabilities also offer help in registering 
to vote.
Also, according to NOD, approximately 40 million Americans with disabilities are of 
voting age and 41% of voting-age citizens with disabilities voted in the 2000 elections.
4.2 The Legal Basis for Accessible Voting Systems 
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 requires that all polling places in elections for 
federal office anywhere in the United States have at least one voting system that shall 
“be accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the 
blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access 
and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters.” [HAVA § 
301(a)(3)(A)]
According to the federal Election Assistance Commission (EAC), established by HAVA, 
“[c]ompliance with Section 301(a)(3) requires that the voting system be accessible to 
persons with disabilities as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act, including 
physical, visual, and cognitive disabilities, such that the disabled individual can privately 
and independently receive instruction, make selections, and cast a ballot.” [EAC 
Advisory 2005-004, issued July 20, 2005.] This means, among other things, that states 
must acquire and make available voting systems that will accommodate the basic range 
of impairments, including cerebral palsy, aphasia, low vision, blindness, deaf-blindness 
and hearing impairment. 
In addition to the Americans with Disabilities Act, HAVA and the EAC’s Voluntary Voting 
System Guidelines (VVSG), most states have voting system standards that further extend 
the accessibility requirements.
85. Recent History of Voting Access for Voters With 
Disabilities
Originally, people with disabilities were not considered to be qualified to vote. 
Eventually, they were permitted to vote but were forced to allow election officials in the 
voting booth. For decades now, most states have allowed a personal choice of assistant 
to help in the voting booth.
With the passage of the Help America Vote Act, the goal of privacy and access for all 
voters with disabilities, as well as an end to hanging chad and over- and undervoting, 
seemed within reach.
Vendors began showing primitively modified prototype “accessible” voting systems. 
The computer interfaces on some of these new machine prototypes allowed some 
voters who were blind to vote successfully with audio output and tactile control keys. 
These new direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting systems seemed to hold a great deal 
of promise for reliable and accessible voting. This encouraged many to become vocal 
advocates of DRE voting systems. The National Federation of the Blind (NFB) and others 
strongly pushed for DREs in order to “hurry up and get accessible voting for the blind.”
Today, the goal of private and independent voting has been achieved by some voters 
with disabilities. But many others have been disappointed and frustrated because they 
have not been able to vote privately and independently as they had hoped and as 
voting-system vendors had promised.
As this paper details, many of the DREs in use today do not fulfill the promise of 
accessibility for the majority of voters with disabilities. 
5.1 Voting System Security and the Need for Paper Ballots
Because HAVA encouraged the purchase of DRE voting systems on the grounds that 
they were supposed to be accessible, they are now prevalent throughout the United 
States. As DRE security problems surfaced publicly, voter-verifiable paper audit trails 
(VVPATs) were proposed as the security “fix.” Many disabilities advocates, thinking 
VVPATs would be just like paper ballots, worried that voters would be required but 
unable to handle the paper themselves, so VVPATs became a security versus access issue 
for many.
Many disability rights advocates feared that counties would use DRE security issues to 
justify delaying making their polls and voting accessible. Attacking DREs for bad security 
was considered by some disabilities advocates as an attack on the access movement. 
(Actually, most of the concerns about DRE security problems come from computer 
scientists and transparent-voting advocates, not from foot-dragging counties.)
It is now clear that voter verification of the paper record is necessary to guarantee 
reliability and security. The only voting systems that permit truly accessible verification 
9of the paper record are the ballot marking devices (BMDs, which are mechanical or 
computerized devices that help the voter mark votes on standard optical-scan paper 
ballots). 
Hursti II, the Princeton University hack/virus demo, and other high-profile DRE security 
vulnerability revelations have forced many advocates for accessible voting to accept the 
need for security through paper ballots.
Many disability voting rights advocates now accept the notion that access and security 
are both important and not incompatible, and this is resulting in a slow but steady 
movement toward support of paper-ballot-based voting systems.
5.2 The Promise of HAVA
Initially, with the passage of HAVA, many thought electronic voting systems would be 
great for reliability and accessibility. 
Like many others, most of us in the disability community trusted that “federal testing” 
would assure security and accessibility, but we eventually found that we’d been misled. 
DREs did not turn out to be as secure, reliable or accessible as promised. And there 
turned out to be no actual “federal testing” by federal labs or “independent testing 
authorities” (ITAs). Instead, the “federal testing” was conducted by private labs that 
received payments from the voting machine vendors themselves, thereby creating an 
inherent conflict of interest. 
Currently, there is no proper testing of the accessibility of voting machines, and there is 
no standard for comparison of results from accessibility, usability and accuracy testing. 
Clearly, the ITA labs’ testing of DREs and previous federal certification do not assure 
good disability accessibility compliance of a voting machine.
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6. The Author’s Experiences With Voting Systems
I have had experience with the Sequoia Edge II DRE in five real-world elections in 
addition to testing most of the available voting systems at conferences, accessible 
voting equipment fairs and the NFB Baltimore accessible voting systems lab. 
Note that the frequent mention of the Sequoia Edge II DRE voting system in this report 
is not meant to indicate that it is any better or worse than any other voting system.
For a more complete description of each election, see Appendix B: Personal Experiences 
in Voting on the Sequoia Edge II DREs.
6.1 March 2004 Election 
In my first attempt to vote on a DRE in a real election, the poll workers were never able 
to get any of the machines at our polling place to boot with the audio assist feature 
working. After 45 minutes of struggling with the systems, the poll workers gave up and I 
had to have someone do my voting for me. 
6.2 November 2004 Election
From the time I signed in and got my voter smart card, it took eight minutes to reboot 
the machine as an audio voting machine, 30 minutes to make my choices, 23 minutes to 
review and verify, and another four minutes to make a correction and record my vote. So 
in all, it took me about 65 minutes to mark and record my ballot. An added complication 
was that the ballot races on the Sequoia voting machine were not in the same order as 
those printed in the previously released public sample ballot.
6.3 November 2005 Election
The poll workers were unable to get the Sequoia machine booted up in the audio mode. 
After my wife borrowed the poll workers’ operator’s manual and figured out the correct 
audio boot process, she finally managed to get the machine properly rebooted and 
talking. 
After 18 very frustrating minutes trying to get through the reboot process, it took about 
six minutes to fill out the eight choices on the very short ballot, seven minutes to review 
my vote, and another minute to record my ballot and finish. My total time working on 
the voting machine was 32 minutes. 
Clearly, if I hadn’t been very tenacious and taken my own computer expert along when I 
went to vote, I wouldn’t have been able to vote privately.
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6.4 June 2006 Election
For 12 minutes, the poll workers struggled repeatedly to program the voter ID card 
properly so it would cause my voting machine to talk. After they gave up, I was able to 
convince them that they were not encoding my voter ID card properly. Luckily, at the 
previous Voter Access Advisory Committee meeting, a member of the registrar of voters 
staff told me the trick to properly encoding the voter ID card for audio access mode.
After that, it took 31 minutes for me to navigate through the ballot-marking procedure. 
It then took eight more minutes for it to play out the ballot review. At this point, I 
decided that I needed to change one of my votes to a write-in, and that complicated 
and tedious procedure took another seven minutes.
By the time the Sequoia Edge II system printed the non-accessible paper trail and then 
spit out my voter ID card, I had spent a total of 59.5 minutes trying to vote privately.
6.5 November 2006 Election
This time the poll workers knew how to properly set up the audio mode, so it only took 
about eight minutes to switch the Sequoia to audio. This makes only two out of five 
times that our poll workers have been able to successfully set up the audio voting mode 
by themselves. 
The audio vote casting took a total of one hour and 17 minutes at the machine, not 
counting the time waiting in line to get in.
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7. Lack of Accessibility of Voting Systems
Most of the voting-system manufacturers say they are working on making future 
improvements to the audio prompts and other capabilities of their DRE machines. This 
sounds good and should be encouraged. However, like the dual-switch input-control 
feature and other access options that have long been promised by several of these 
vendors, these features are still not available on most of our real voting systems in our 
real polling places today.
As my own experiences prove, it is certainly possible for some tenacious voters with 
disabilities to get through the voting process successfully on these voting systems. 
However, that experienced computer and access-technology users like myself have had 
such frustrating experiences trying to use the DRE voting systems clearly indicates that 
these systems have not been designed to provide appropriate access for the general 
population of voters with disabilities. 
The problems that poll workers have had properly setting up the DRE voting systems for 
use by voters with disabilities show that the machines also are not designed properly for 
operation by the general population of poll workers. The problem is due to flaws in the 
human-factors design of the DREs and should not be blamed on either the poll workers’ 
or the voters’ lack of technical expertise or training. Clearly, most of these DREs were not 
designed correctly to be operated in the real world by normal poll workers and voters. 
In general, the setup of these machines in audio access mode is still too complicated for 
the average poll worker, marking and reviewing the ballot is too complex and takes a 
very long time for the audio voter, the physical privacy shielding is much worse than it 
used to be with punch-card systems, and audio voters do not have any way of verifying 
the paper audit trail privately or otherwise.
7.1 A Summary of Accessibility Problems With DREs as Currently 
Deployed
Most of the available DRE voting systems do not meet current HAVA and ADA disability 
accommodation requirements and are far from being able to comply with the new 
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. They are not accessible for significant numbers of 
individuals with disabilities for at least the following reasons: 
The lack of a dual-switch input-control interface on systems such as Diebold 
AccuVote TSX and ES&S iVotronic. These systems are inaccessible to many voters 
with severe manual dexterity disabilities who are unable to use touch screens or 
tactile key inputs.
The inadequacy of most of the systems’ audio access features for voters who 
are blind or have visual impairments, cognitive impairments, severe motor 
impairments or dyslexia. One of the results is that marking and reviewing the 
ballot takes an extremely long time for audio voters. 
1.
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The lack of simultaneous and synchronized audio and visual outputs. These 
systems are inaccessible to many voters with visual impairments. For example, 
the failure of many of the DREs to accommodate elderly voters who have 
developed severe visual impairments with age but are unfamiliar with, and 
unable to cope with, audio-only access technology because they have had 
normal vision most of their lives.
The lack of voter-adjustable magnification, contrast and display color settings 
that can improve the readability of text on the video displays.
Confusing menu-selection systems that are difficult for people with cognitive 
disabilities to use effectively.
Almost all of the systems’ blatant lack of adequate privacy curtains to prevent 
eavesdroppers from reading voters’ selections on their visual displays. This 
violates, among other things, voters’ constitutional rights to cast private and 
secret ballots.
The systems’ lack of capability to allow voters with disabilities to select for 
themselves different access modes or features to provide accessibility without 
intervention from poll workers.
Lack of proper boosted audio output levels for voters with hearing impairments.
The inadequate tactile control keypads on most of the systems.
The requirement, on some electronic voting systems, of voters to manually 
handle paper ballots or voter ID cards, which may make it difficult or impossible 
for some voters with severe manual dexterity impairments to complete the 
voting process independently.
The verification of the VVPATs on the systems is inaccessible to many voters with 
visual or motor impairments and voters with special language needs so that 
these voters cannot personally verify the printout of VVPAT printers on the DRE 
systems.
In other words, a significant portion of citizens with disabilities or special language 
needs who attempt to cast their votes on these poorly designed voting machines will be 
unable to do so privately and independently. 
See Appendix C: Detailed Lack of Accessibility on Voting Systems for more information.
7.2 Access Technologies That Have Been Available 
The above failures and omissions could have been corrected using available adaptive or 
other technologies. Affordable disability-access technologies are readily available and 
have been so for more than a decade.
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Many voters with visual impairments can now regularly use large-text, speech or braille 
interface systems on computers to do word processing, e-mail and Web browsing. 
Unreasonable cost or unavailable technology cannot be argued as an excuse for the lack 
of accessible DRE designs. 
See Appendix D: Available and Well-Established Access Technologies.
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8. Description and Analysis of the Major Types of Voting 
Systems
Most mechanical voting machines such as lever machines and punch cards are rapidly 
being phased out and so will not be discussed in this report. There are a number of 
types of voting machines that are available for use. These include computer-based 
machines, of which DREs and BMDs are a subset; paper-based machines; tactile ballot-
marking aids; vote by mail; and telephone-based systems. 
8.1 Computer-Based Voting Machines
Computer-based voting terminals allow voters to use a computer to mark a paper ballot 
or create an electronic ballot. By touching a computer screen, pressing keys or using 
other technologies, the voter interacts with a computer to mark or create a ballot, as 
opposed to using a pencil to hand-mark a paper ballot. DRE voting machines and most 
BMDs use computer interfaces. 
Computerized voting machines have been assumed by some to be better than low-tech 
voting systems, but this is not so in all cases. For example, closed-circuit TV magnifiers 
or electronic video magnifiers offer simple, language-independent, high-contrast 
magnification access for reading and marking paper ballots. It is likely that every polling 
place with paper ballots could benefit from having an electronic video magnifier aid.
It is important to note that touch screens are just a type of computer interface and that 
the term “touch screen” is technically not a proper alternate name for all the DRE voting 
machines.
Some DRE voting machines do not have a touch screen, and some voting systems that 
are not DREs have touch screens. For example, the full-face ballot system, or FFBS, is also 
a type of user interface for voting systems. FFBS machines have a single-sided ballot 
affixed over a large panel of lights and buttons. When the voter presses a choice on the 
ballot, the press is sensed by the switch behind the ballot and turns on the light, which 
shines through the paper at that point, indicating the selection. Some officials have the 
mistaken impression that having all races displayed on a single full-face ballot is the best 
way to make the voting process cognitively simple for the voters. On the contrary, it is 
clearly much simpler and easier on the voter to have a straight linear ballot showing only 
one race per page or screen. 
In addition to differentiating among voting systems by the user interface they offer, it is 
helpful to differentiate by the vote-storage medium they use and whether the medium 
is for counting, auditing or just backup. DREs are computerized electronic voting 
systems that record votes in electronic memory or electronic ballots. With exceptions 
such as the eSlate DRE and the full-face ballot machines, most DRE systems have touch 
screens.
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8.2 Electronic Ballot Systems (DREs With Voter-Verifiable Paper Audit 
Trails)
The term VVPAT has usually meant a roll-to-roll paper printer with a window that 
permits the voter to view a printed copy of his or her vote. This is meant to allow the 
voter to verify the printout to guarantee its accuracy for possible audits.
Some of the VVPAT systems have a continuous paper roll with the paper record under 
glass and not removable by the voter. A slightly different version of a VVPAT that 
attempts to remove the voter-sequence correlation privacy exposure uses separate 
cut sheets of paper that are displayed under glass, kept inside the machine and not 
voter-removable. 
Many states have required such printers on their DRE voting systems. Currently, there 
is no way for most voters with visual impairments to accessibly verify the printed votes 
on DRE paper trails. Although the technology exists to scan and read back the paper 
record, it has not been deployed in conjunction with DREs. 
Moreover, there are additional problems with the accessibility of DREs with VVPAT as 
currently configured and deployed:
The VVPAT window may be physically inaccessible for viewing by many voters 
with motor impairments. 
The poor-quality print on VVPATs is usually hard to read because of the small 
font size and low contrast, due to use of cheap thermal printers.
The VVPAT must be disconnected when the Diebold AccuVote TSX is used for 
curbside voting. In this case, the curbside voter will have no way to check the 
VVPAT printout.
The ES&S iVotronic has no full-ballot paper verification. Instead, it prints and 
displays each selection you make, as you make it, in its small real-time audit-log 
window.
The Sequoia Edge II does not pause the VVPAT printing to allow reading 
for voters using the audio feature. It flies through multi-window printouts 
without pausing, making the assumption that no one will be trying to read it 
for verifying. This prevents a sighted assistant or a sighted voter with a motor 
impairment from verifying the ballot.
Reviewing the electronic record in the DRE’s memory with audio is not the same as 
verifying by reading the print on the VVPAT, despite the bogus claims to the contrary 
made by some of the DRE vendors. Unless the system employs a scanner to read back 
what actually was printed on the paper trail, such a system should not be considered a 
voter-verified paper audit trail that is truly accessible.
•
•
•
•
•
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8.3 Paper-Ballot Voting Systems
Paper-based systems involve the voter marking a paper ballot with a pencil or with a 
ballot-marking device. The paper ballot is then optically scanned into a device that reads 
and counts the ballots.
Paper-ballot systems can be more flexible than computer-based systems in some 
cases, such as allowing absentee voting from home and even allowing voters who are 
profoundly deaf-blind to vote on paper ballots with tactile ballot-marking systems. 
For another example, optical-scan paper ballots can be used with electronic video 
magnifiers for absentee voting from home or at the polling place.
HAVA specifically calls for ballots cast in polling places to be checked for overvotes 
so the voter will have an opportunity to correct the ballot. If ballots are collected in 
precinct ballot boxes without checking and then tabulated by a central-count optical 
scanner (CCOS) at some other site, the voter will not have an opportunity to make 
corrections for overvotes. For this reason, the checking of and warnings about ballots 
should be done in the polling place by a precinct count optical scanner (when the voter 
turns in the ballot) or perhaps by an electronic BMD. 
Many polling places are blending or combining precinct-count optical scanners (PCOS) 
for optical-scan paper ballots and BMDs for accommodating voters with disabilities. 
This is the approach used in New Mexico, where they threw out all of their DRE voting 
systems and switched to optical-scan ballots and AutoMARK BMDs.
8.4 Ballot-Marking Devices 
BMDs record votes on paper ballots rather than electronic ballots or memory cards. The 
AutoMARK and Populex BMDs are examples of computerized electronic voting systems 
that have touch screens but record votes on paper ballots.
Many voters have wrongly assumed that the only way to get a broad spectrum of 
accessibility interfaces was with DRE voting systems because DREs are electronic 
and computerized. BMDs such as AutoMARK and Populex are also electronic and 
computerized and can give just as broad a spectrum of accessibility. In practice, the 
AutoMARK and Populex systems can provide better accessibility than most of the 
older DREs because both of these BMDs were designed from the start with access 
requirements and user interfaces in mind.
BMDs can also support multilingual ballots just as well as DRE systems can.
The main electronic voting systems that can support the security needs of a voter-
verified paper ballot (VVPB) and allow voters with disabilities to accessibly verify the 
VVPB reliably, privately and independently are the AutoMARK and Populex BMDs. VVPBs 
are very different from the VVPAT systems because the paper ballot of a VVPB system is 
used for the main vote-tabulation record, not just for auditing. 
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Generally, the BMD class includes AutoMARK Populex InkaVote and Avante Vote-Tracker 
BMD devices, and tactile ballot-marking devices such as the Rhode Island tactile ballot, 
the Vote-PAD and the Equalivote. 
8.4.1 When Is Independence Required for Privacy?
It is important to be aware of the difference between independence and privacy in 
voting procedures.
Independence is not essential to guaranteeing privacy before a voter starts marking 
their ballot. Independence is required to assure privacy during the process of marking 
the ballot but is not essential for guaranteeing privacy after the ballot has been 
deposited into, and protected by, a privacy sleeve. 
Absolute independence is not required for the parts of the voting process that come 
before and after vote selection, ballot marking and deposition into a privacy sleeve.
Some advocates of DRE voting machines have suggested that print paper ballot-
marking systems such as the AutoMARK might not accommodate independent handling 
of the privacy-sleeved print ballot by some voters with severe motor impairments. On 
the other hand, independent handling and insertion of voter ID cards in DRE voting 
machines can also represent a similar problem for some voters with severe motor 
impairments. 
People who cannot manipulate a paper ballot independently may also not be able to 
handle and insert or remove a voter ID card independently. In some cases, for voters 
with limited manual dexterity for gripping ballots or smart cards, the larger paper ballot 
may be easier to manipulate than the smaller voter ID card. In other cases, the voters 
may be able to handle voter ID cards but not paper ballots.
Although the handling issues for cards and ballots are not necessarily the same, either 
one may prevent completely independent voting. In neither case do they have to 
compromise the voter’s ballot privacy (assuming proper use of privacy sleeves). 
If DRE advocates can argue that complete manipulation independence is not that 
important for voter ID card handling, they must concede that independent handling of 
privacy-sleeved paper ballots is also not essential. Having a poll worker help you handle 
your voter ID card or your privacy-sleeved paper ballot does not prevent you from 
keeping your ballot choices private. 
Some voters with manual dexterity impairments may not be able to handle either voter 
ID cards or paper ballots independently.
I recently discussed this subject with a Stanford network engineering friend who has 
severe motor impairments. He said he felt that, for many voters with limited manual 
dexterity, printed paper ballots are easier to manipulate than small smart cards. He also 
said the important issue for independent voting should primarily be independently 
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marking, reviewing and verifying the ballot to assure true secrecy and privacy of one’s 
vote. He said independently handling the voter ID card or the privacy-sleeved printed 
ballot is relatively unimportant. 
It is foolish to pretend that all voters with severe motor impairments can manage their 
voting activity in a polling place absolutely independently. For example, many cannot 
sign their name on the sign-in register, but that does not prevent them from having a 
private and reasonably independent vote.
When a friend with severe motor impairments tried to vote on the Sequoia Edge II, he 
found that he had to have a poll worker stand behind the touch-screen unit and hold up 
its back end to keep it from falling off his lap the whole time he was voting. Though it 
was private, this was not independent voting.
 If completely independent handling of paper ballots and voter ID cards is decided to be 
absolutely necessary for complying with access requirements, then DRE and BMD voting 
system manufacturers will be forced to redesign their products to offer automated 
handling of ballots and cards for this special class of voters or redesign the systems to 
not use any physical ballots or ID cards. The impact of such changes on voting hardware 
costs and voting system security may be so high that it might be better to invest the 
same resources in improving other aspects of the accessibility of voting systems, 
including physical access to polling places. 
Manufacturers should be encouraged to improve their voting machinery accessibility to 
minimize independent-handling issues for voter cards and paper ballots. For example, 
because of foot and legroom clearance issues, ballot boxes and precinct optical 
scanners should clearly be made more accessible by adding slot extension or side-load 
chutes to better accommodate paper-ballot voters in wheelchairs.
8.4.2 The AutoMARK Ballot-Marking Device
The AutoMARK looks something like other touch-screen electronic voting systems, with 
the addition of a built-in ballot scanner and printer.
Like the tactile ballot systems, the AutoMARK produces a marked paper ballot that can 
be accessibly verified by voters with disabilities. 
The AutoMARK has the best access user interface of all the available voting systems. 
It has simultaneous audio-video; built-in rate and volume controls; cognitively simple 
tactile control keys; dual-switch input controls; and video controls for font size, color and 
contrast. Accessibility functions and user interfaces were included from the beginning of 
the AutoMARK’s design, not tacked on later as modifications or Band-Aids.
Because the ballot printer-scanner is a mechanical system, ballot jams or failure-to-print 
problems can occur, especially if county elections officials have not learned how to 
design and produce the ballots properly. The AutoMARK manufacturer has said that the 
problems related to using perforated-edge ballots torn from pads of ballots, instead 
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of clean-edged ballots, have been fixed, and the fix should be available in the next 
certified version of the AutoMARK software.
After vote selection and ballot marking, the print ballot can be removed from the 
AutoMARK. If the voter wants, the ballot can even be reinserted at a later time to 
re-scan and verify the ballot marking. The ballot can be automatically deposited into 
a privacy sleeve that is hooked to the ballot feed slot. The sleeve protects the voter’s 
ballot privacy, shielding it from eavesdropping and assuring that no poll worker or other 
assistant can sneak a peek at the ballot while helping a voter move the privacy-sleeved 
ballot to a ballot box or precinct scanner. Many voting-access advocates appear unaware 
of the fact that the ballot can be automatically deposited into a privacy sleeve without 
requiring manual handling before it reaches the privacy sleeve. If the voter desires, a 
poll worker can help move the privacy-sleeved ballot to the ballot box or PCOS without 
a sacrifice of privacy. 
It has been suggested that there is a potential threat to privacy when only one voter 
votes on an AutoMARK during an election day. If someone were to break into the ballot 
box or PCOS ballot storage, they might be able to identify which ballot was marked very 
neatly by the AutoMARK, and this might be correlated with the identity of the single 
voter who used the AutoMARK. The same kind of risk exists when there is only a single 
voter on a DRE voting system. On either DREs or BMDs, someone taking such a big risk 
to determine the vote of a single voter is considered very unlikely. The simple way to 
block this privacy threat is to make sure additional voters vote on the accessible DRE 
or BMD voting machine. This solution shows that the unique-marked-ballot is a bogus 
privacy concern.
AutoMARK voters maintain their essential independence and privacy when they make 
vote selections independently and have the AutoMARK mark their ballots for them. 
When moving the ballot to a ballot box or precinct scanner (with or without assistance), 
complete independence is not essential for maintaining the privacy of the voter’s ballot.
8.4.3 The Populex Ballot-Marking Device
The Populex is an electronic BMD that is similar to the AutoMARK in many ways. Its 
major difference is that it prints a ballot slip that is not plain text and readable like 
a regular optical-scan ballot. Instead, it is tabulated by bar-code scanning. For voter 
verification, the ballot has printed numeric codes the voter can read by eye and then 
translate by looking up the number on a special chart. Because of this, the Populex 
paper ballot slip is not easy to visually read and verify. It is also more difficult for people 
with low vision or cognitive impairments to verify directly.
8.4.4 The InkaVote Ballot-Marking Device
The InkaVote (used in Los Angeles County) is a ballot-marking device that uses ballot 
cards about the size of the old punch-card ballots. Instead of punching holes in the 
card, voters use a manual marking device to ink mark their selections on the card. The 
InkaVote ballot card ends up with only marks and no printed text. For access by voters 
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with disabilities, there is a computerized ballot-marking terminal with speech output 
and visual display that can be used to make selections and mark the ballot card for the 
voter. At the end of the marking process, the ballot card is automatically deposited into a 
privacy sleeve. This system is similar to other optical-scan paper ballot systems in that it 
uses a precinct optical scanner specially designed to scan and count paper ballot cards. 
Because the ballot cards do not contain any text, they, like the ballots from the Populex, 
are considered to be language-independent. 
8.4.5 The Avante Ballot-Marking Device
Avante offers the Vote-Trakker DRE voting system with an external roll-to-roll VVPAT 
print-trail option, and it also offers a Vote-Trakker BMD version with a standard external 
cut-sheet printer for printing paper ballots.
The ballot-marking version of the Vote-Trakker prints a complete image of the voter’s 
ballot on separate blank sheets of ballot paper, rather than printing on a continuous 
roll of paper. Although this ballot marking version is based on Avante’s standard 
Vote-Trakker DRE terminal, the direct-recording electronic memory and vote-counting 
capability can be disabled when printing ballots in the BMD configuration. 
Avante claims that this is an accessibly verifiable ballot system because an electronic 
representation of the graphical information printed on the ballot can be read back 
from the Vote-Trakker’s memory with the Vote-Trakker’s display screen or audio 
output feature. However, the Avante ballot printer is just a standard inexpensive 
off-the-shelf printer with no built-in image scanner capability that would allow a voter 
to authentically verify the ballot marking by reading back and reviewing the printing 
on the paper ballot. Because of this lack of scanning verification, voters with visual 
reading impairments would have no way to be sure that the paper ballot did not have 
an accidental or malicious misrepresentation of the ballot information they reviewed 
on the Vote-Trakker screen or audio output. Despite the manufacturer’s claims to the 
contrary, this Avante BMD system does not truly provide accessible verification of the 
paper ballot printout. 
Additionally, unlike some BMDs that can automatically deposit the finished ballot into 
private containment such as a privacy sleeve, the Avante Vote-Trakker BMD printer 
does not automatically deposit the finished paper ballot into a privacy sleeve, precinct 
scanner or ballot box. This represents a serious privacy risk for many voters, especially 
those who can not manually handle the bare ballot pages for themselves. 
As implemented in New York state, the finished paper ballots of the Vote-Trakker BMD 
must be manually placed inside a privacy envelope, which is handed in and separately 
held for later counting, somewhat like provisional paper ballots. New York voters with 
visual impairments have expressed concerns that this means their votes might not really 
be counted. 
Because non-scanning BMD printing systems such as this Avante BMD do not provide 
authentic accessible verification and do present major independent ballot-handling 
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privacy risks, there are grave concerns that this might become a widespread but 
unacceptable model for cheap attempts to convert other DREs into supposedly 
“accessible” and “secure” BMDs.
8.5 Tactile Ballot-Marking Aids
Tactile ballot-marking devices (TBMDs) are technically BMDs and are basically 
mechanical aids for marking paper ballots.
Most TBMDs have a sleeve into which a paper ballot can be slipped and held in place. 
The sleeve has tactile indicators that are next to holes in the sleeve. These holes line up 
with the ballot mark positions, so the voter can insert a pen and mark the selection on 
the paper ballot.
On April 27, 2001, the National Organization on Disability presented the Elections 
Division of the Rhode Island secretary of state’s office with an award for its pioneering 
work in introducing tactile ballots for voting systems.
The Vote-PAD and the Equalivote are newer tactile ballot-marking aids that include 
mark-sensing verification wands. Verification wands are small, handheld devices that 
vibrate when their tip is held over a marked position on a paper ballot. This allows the 
voter to review their ballot and check each ballot marking position for the presence or 
absence of a mark. Verification wands are a significant development for tactile ballot 
systems, as they even permit accessible verification of the paper ballot record.
In my testing of a tactile ballot with a verification wand, the wand was even successfully 
used to confirm the erasure of an unwanted pencil mark. That saved the ballot from 
having to be discarded and a new ballot completely re-marked. 
Ballot navigation instructions can be in braille, audio or large print.
The finished ballot looks like anyone else’s marked ballot.
A tactile ballot system with braille instructions is the only available method for voters 
who are profoundly deaf-blind to vote privately.
Tactile ballots can also be used by many voters with motor impairments, some even with 
mouth-stick pens. However, tactile ballot-marking systems are not accessible for voters 
with severe motor impairments that limit them to making selections with dual-switch 
input controls.
Because some voters who are blind cannot write with a pen or pencil, having only 
cut-out windows as write-in guides on tactile ballots may not be considered adequate. 
Some tactile ballot systems have a way to spell a write-in name by marking letters 
on a separate tactile grid page (although it is very tedious and awkward, as are other 
“accessible” write-in procedures on most electronic voting systems). 
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Tactile ballots can also be used to facilitate private and accessible absentee voting by 
many voters with disabilities. Since voters without disabilities can independently and 
privately vote absentee, why shouldn’t voters with disabilities also have the right to do 
the same?
Would there be any real reason that private organizations or individuals could not 
volunteer to make up and supply tactile ballot sleeves and materials to help voters 
with disabilities to independently and privately mark their own absentee ballots? Such 
approaches might work well for absentee voting from home but should not relieve 
government officials from making their polling-place voting systems accessible.
Some resistance to tactile ballots comes from those who want accessible electronic 
voting systems and are worried that financially strained counties might force them to 
use tactile ballots instead of more complete access solutions.
A number of voters, myself included, who have had a chance to try out the Vote-PAD 
tactile ballot system have been disappointed by the poor quality of the audio and braille 
instruction materials, as well as by the write-in tactile grid pages. The quality of the 
Vote-PAD materials could and should be improved substantially. The audio instructions 
should be recorded by a human reader, rather than the synthetic speech used in an 
effort to cut costs.
Tactile ballot systems with verification wands are potentially a useful voting aid. 
However, major but simple-to-implement changes need to be made to the currently 
offered tactile ballot systems. Also, tactile ballot systems should be promoted and seen 
as a voting aid with unique capabilities, not as a replacement for broadly accessible 
voting systems.
8.6 Vote-by-Mail Systems
Voting by mail (VBM) requires support with aids such as tactile ballot aids.
VBM systems cannot accommodate private voting by many voters with disabilities, such 
as those with severe motor impairments, unless they have other tools such as access to a 
computer they can use with a printer to mark a paper absentee ballot — essentially their 
own home BMD.
VBM systems can be more accessible for some because they don’t require transportation 
and access to public polling places.
There are serious security, privacy and voter-coercion concerns associated with vote-
by-mail systems. Many voters’ rights organizations are worried by the increasing use of 
vote-by-mail systems.
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8.7 Telephone-Based Systems
Vote-By-Phone (VBP) systems function something like a voice mail system, with the 
voter entering their selections by pressing keys on the phone’s keypad, while listening 
to computer-controlled audio messages.
Many folks with disabilities like the idea of voting by phone, because they think it means 
that they could vote from home and avoid hassles of transportation and physical access 
to polling places. It is one of only a few systems that could allow voters with certain 
disabilities to vote from home.
Regrettably, they may not realize that remote vote-by-phone is not currently being 
considered very seriously, as it has extremely challenging and serious security, privacy 
and voter-coercion problems. 
In contrast to using remote telephones operated from home, some Vote-By-Phone (VBP) 
systems are designed to be used only from inside a polling place. The IVS Inspire and 
Avante IVR are examples of voting systems that use telephones for the voter terminal in 
the polling place. 
Although the polling-place VBP systems have many of the significant security and 
privacy drawbacks of remote VBP, some of the problems are reduced by physical 
presence and identification of the voters in the polling place. 
It is not surprising to hear some people with disabilities, especially those who are 
totally blind, say they like the idea of phone voting systems. Voters who are totally blind 
generally find telephone systems easy to operate. Unfortunately, meeting the access 
needs of just voters who are totally blind only solves part of the challenge of accessible 
voting systems. 
Voters with severe manual dexterity impairments may need dual-switch-touch-tone 
input control converters or other special telephone interface modifications. Polling place 
telephones will need to support more of the wide variety of special telephone interface 
modifications that many folks with manual dexterity impairments are now using on 
their home phone systems. It won’t work to just say, “Let them use a mouth stick.” Some 
voters with severe motor impairments can use mouth sticks or helmet-mounted sticks 
on properly designed telephone keypads, but others can’t. To relate to the challenge 
of voting with a head-controlled stick, the reader might try to imagine attempting to 
operate a telephone keypad with a small baseball bat held in their mouth. 
Because of hearing and/or cognitive impairments, many voters (especially many of the 
elderly) cannot handle interface systems that only use voice output; they can’t even deal 
with basic voice mail systems. 
As demonstrated on DRE voting systems, many voters with disabilities cannot manage 
to use voting systems that aren’t capable of simultaneously presenting audio and visual 
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information. This is why the VVSG access guidelines call for simultaneous audio and 
visual output capability on voting systems. 
Some voters who can’t handle audio-only output might be helped by “cheat sheet” 
cards with large printed representations of the talking menu systems, to help them 
follow along visually as they listen to the audio output of the phone. Some of these 
voters would need these printed in white-on-black or with other high contrast colors. 
Even such large print aids will not be enough to allow certain voters with low vision to 
vote by phone. Voters with low vision who cannot use the vote-by-phone system might 
need closed-circuit TV or digital magnifiers to allow them to read, mark, and verify 
optical scan or other paper ballots.
Other voters have such severe hearing impairments that they cannot use the phone 
systems’ audio output at all. Voters who cannot vote with audio output would need 
some other system such as hand marked optical scan ballots. Currently the only 
available voting systems that can accommodate voters who are profoundly deaf-blind 
are the optical scan tactile ballot marking systems with vibrating mark verification 
wands. 
Polling-place voting systems using only telephone terminals for accessibility will not be 
HAVA-compliant. Their accessibility is too limited to accommodate the required wide 
spectrum of voters with disabilities. By themselves, VBP systems will not meet many 
of the access requirements of the new VVSG standards for dual-switch input controls, 
tactile keys that can be operated with a single hand, simultaneous audio-video display, 
or any large-print visual displays. However, it may be possible for VBP systems to be 
included as part of a carefully designed and blended system that, as a whole, could fully 
accommodate all voting system accessibility requirements. 
Counties intent on using the currently offered phone voting systems will have to plan 
on blending VBP systems with other voting systems and adding a variety of other access 
options, support materials and procedures. 
For privacy, security and reliability reasons, counties planning to use VBP systems will 
need to consider the costs and logistics of arranging for dedicated phone lines in each 
of their polling places. Obviously, the need for secure phone lines may limit the choice 
of sites for polling places. Counties should also carefully consider their VBP system’s 
performance requirements, to avoid audio message “traffic jams” during periods of peak 
voting activity.
There are serious concerns about the privacy and integrity of the verifiable paper trail 
and the paper ballot systems now used or proposed for the VBP systems. In some cases, 
the paper trail is printed at the remote VBP support center. In others, the ballot is sent 
back from the support center as a fax, to be printed and cast in a ballot box in the phone 
voter’s polling place. Faxing a copy of the support center printout back to the polling 
place does not offer voters who are blind any accessible method to verify their ballot. 
In some VBP systems, the paper record is printed in bar codes and in text at the remote 
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support center. It is then scanned back into the computer by a bar code scanner, and 
this scanned bar code version of the ballot is read back to the voter to “verify” the plain 
text. Because the bar code version might not match the text or the computer might 
be speaking falsely to the voter, this is a very unreliable method of verifying the vote 
printed on the paper record. 
In a VBP system recently proposed to officials of an East Coast state, workers at the 
remote support center were expected to manually transcribe the text version of 
the printout onto an optical scan marked sense ballot. Many members of the state’s 
disabilities community objected to this method of marking optical scan ballots, as they 
felt it violated their privacy and did not include a method to verify the accuracy of the 
ballot transcription process. Generally, as is the case with DRE voting systems, polling 
place telephone voting systems configured as electronic ballot record systems can 
present serious problems for supporting reliably accessible paper trails. 
Some advocates of VBP systems have said the systems are like a simple pencil, and are 
not at all like a computerized voting system. Telephones may seem simpler because 
most people are used to using them daily. However, as included in VBP systems 
such as the IVS Inspire or Avante IVR, the phones are just terminals on what amounts 
to a distributed data processing system, configured to record either electronic or 
paper ballots. Unlike pencils, VBP systems contain computers, software and other 
nontransparent “black box” components that voters must trust to operate correctly. 
Because of their computerized systems and other hidden components, these vote-by-
phone systems should be tested carefully, managed with good security practices and 
open to responsible public monitoring, just like other computerized voting systems. 
Disturbingly, some of the VBP manufacturers have not even bothered to apply for 
federal testing and certification, or they have not been able to pass the testing and 
certification. Clearly, there are nightmarish problems inherent in trying to responsibly 
test and certify each of the telephone networks that might be used to connect VBP 
support center computers to the voter phone terminals and ballot fax printers in the 
polling places.
Some of these serious drawbacks of polling place VBP systems are offset by attractive 
VBP features such as:
General public familiarity with phone terminals.
Simpler operation for poll workers.
Lower cost for each voter terminal. 
Attractive one year lease contracts offered by at least one of the major VBP 
vendors.
•
•
•
•
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8.8 DREs With Paper-Roll VVPAT Printers and Optical Scanners
Some DRE manufacturers have proposed using optical scanners with their DRE 
systems to permit accessible scanning and verification of the VVPAT paper trails. Some 
companies are working on designs for VVPAT systems with optical character recognition 
(OCR) scanners (for clear text paper trails), and some are working on optical bar-code 
recognition (OBR) scanners for VVPATs that print the paper trail as optical bar codes.
A security argument in favor of using optical scanning to make verification of the paper 
trail accessible is that DREs might be programmed to cheat more often on the VVPAT of 
voters who are using the accessibility options, assuming that these voters would not be 
as likely to detect the fraud, especially without some way to reliably read and verify the 
actual print on the paper trail. 
OCR and OBR scanner systems may be designed to give access to “reading” the VVPAT 
paper trail with audio and/or large-character displays. A small, portable OCR scanner, 
the Kurzweil Portable Reader, was tested, at my suggestion, by Steve Booth, the voting 
access systems expert at the National Federation of the Blind Access Technology Lab in 
Baltimore. Mr. Booth concluded that, in its current form, the Kurzweil Portable Reader 
doesn’t work well enough in this application to be useful for verification, but it might if 
it were reprogrammed and supported by a mechanical bracket on a VVPAT with a glare 
guard. Because the Portable Reader is a stand-alone unit, the voter would probably 
have to switch to using the reader’s headphones and tactile controls to read the VVPAT. 
Although such a stand-alone scan-and-verify system might be made to work to some 
degree, it would be inherently awkward, confusing and hard for voters to learn.
To simplify the voter interface, it would be necessary to have the vote-selection function 
and the VVPAT scan and verification functions integrated into a single unit with a single 
voter interface. However, in order to obtain module isolation security, a DRE should not 
use the same or connected modules for marking and verification since they are using 
continuous-roll paper instead of separate voter-removable paper ballot sheets. 
If the microprocessor in the DRE system is not powerful enough to give reasonable scan 
and verify response times, then the verification scanner-printer unit might need to have 
a more powerful microprocessor to handle the OCR and verification task itself.
If optical scanning is going to be used to verify the continuous paper-roll print trail 
for voters with disabilities, it is important that the VVPAT scanning and accessible 
verification function be done in a separate system, not the same vote-selection and 
printing unit that might have innocently or otherwise misrepresented the voter’s 
choices on the printout. This is because it would be possible for perverse portions 
of a combined vote-selection, printing and scanning unit to make the same false or 
misleading representation of the ballot in the voter’s pre-printing as well as post-
printing verification reviews.
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To support vote-verification integrity, the verification scanner unit and the vote 
selection/VVPAT unit would have to be completely modularized and isolated from each 
other, preventing any signals from the latter from corrupting the vote represented by 
the verification scanner unit. Housing both units in the same voting-station enclosure 
makes it difficult to assure the isolation and integrity of the two systems, especially if the 
VVPAT is implemented as the typical roll-to-roll printer system. However, isolating them 
as physically separate modules significantly complicates the accessible voter interfaces 
to these modules and makes it much more difficult for voters with disabilities to use.
If the VVPAT uses narrow thermal printer paper, its low contrast and small print size will 
make it difficult to get highly accurate OCR results for any verification scanner. 
This basically means that it may not be possible to design a reasonably voter-friendly 
and easy-to-use VVPAT paper-roll scanner verification system that is also reasonably 
modularized for security. 
Additionally, sequential voter correlation of continuous VVPAT paper rolls risks a privacy 
exposure, especially when only one DRE is used in a polling place. Many counties and 
states are beginning to avoid or even ban the use of roll-to-roll VVPAT systems because 
of the voter privacy exposures associated with correlation of observed order of voters 
using a machine and the sequential vote order on the VVPAT paper roll from the same 
machine.
8.9 DRE Conversion to BMD With Ballot Printer/Scanner/Verifier
Adding a cut-sheet printer to a DRE system in place of the roll-to-roll VVPAT could give it 
a more robust paper audit trail without the sequence-correlation privacy issues or even 
allow it to be converted to a ballot-marking system. When used as a BMD, the DRE’s 
counting and electronic record storage functions would presumably be disabled. 
Whether operating as a BMD or a similarly converted DRE, it will not have truly accessible 
verification of the paper printout unless it includes a scanner/verifier capability to read 
back what is actually printed on the paper.
When a DRE is converted to a BMD by the addition of a cut-sheet ballot printer, each 
voter’s ballot information is printed on a separate paper slip, card or ballot sheet. The 
voter should then be free to remove the paper ballot record and put it in a separate 
ballot scanner and verification unit. This could effectively isolate the vote-selection and 
VVPAT system from the verification scanning system. 
This separate scanner-verifier unit would also have to have its own voter interface with 
accessible input controls and output (including audio and visual output). However, as 
was the case for DREs with paper-roll VVPATs and separate scanner-verifiers, there would 
be serious human-factors complications. It would present the voter with more paper-
handling challenges and require the voter to switch to and learn another accessible 
interface system for the scanner-verifier.
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Alternatively, to simplify the paper handling and the user input control and output 
interfaces, it might be necessary to use voting machines that house the printer and the 
verification scanner in the same enclosure. In this more integrated system, the accessible 
user interface of the DRE would be used by voters to read back and verify the printed 
ballot information from the scanner-verifier portion of the printer-scanner-verifier unit. 
If the printer and scanner-verifier modules are integrated into a single enclosure, the 
system must be designed to allow voters the option of removing the printed ballot 
between the printer output and the input to the verification scanner. This would allow 
voters to have their ballot printouts verified on a different machine if they choose or 
maybe scanned back in and verified at a later time on the same machine they used to 
select votes and print the ballot. 
This option for voter-removable printout to decouple the vote-selection and print-
verification processes is necessary to help keep any mendacious software in a combined 
system from “knowing” that the ballot being scanned for verification was the same 
as the one that was just printed on its printer unit. However, although its verification-
integrity security is much better than that of the DREs’ scannerless roll-to-roll VVPATs 
or scannerless page printers, the combination of a DRE with VVPAT and scanner/verifier 
without  voter-removable paper record does not guarantee perfect isolation or 
decoupling security. 
To accommodate the needs of some voters whose motor impairments make it 
difficult or impossible for them to physically handle any form of paper ballot record 
independently, a combination system could be built to allow the VVPAT paper output to 
be optionally directed into the input of the verification scanner, and then finally directed 
into a secure paper ballot box, all without requiring manual handling of the printed 
paper record.
The hardware of a ballot-verification scanner-printer unit such as this could actually 
be about as simple as a standard fax scanner and printer. Unlike most current VVPAT 
systems, which use flimsy thermal role paper, these systems could print with clear, 
normal-size print on good-quality ballot paper. 
Given the large number of DRE systems already in the field, adding a full-ballot printer-
scanner-verifier system such as this — effectively converting DRE systems into ballot-
marking devices — might be the only method of assuring accessibility and maintaining 
a good-quality voter-verifiable paper record on existing DRE systems. This kind of DRE 
conversion to BMD could end up having many of the design strengths inherent to the 
current electronic BMDs, but only if they can also be converted to be more reliable and 
meet VVSG accessibility standards.
Many of the DREs already in the field are so obsolete that they do not have the 
processing power, design flexibility or other resources to permit their conversion to 
support improved accessibility and/or reliable paper ballot printing/verification.
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9. Ballot-on-Demand Printers in Each Polling Place
Ballot-on-demand (BOD) printing with blank ballot paper and reliable standard 
printers would reduce the costs of paper ballots, assure a reliable and steady supply 
of multilingual ballots, and prevent wasting surplus ballots. Counties would be able to 
buy and stockpile blank ballots pre-printed with the jurisdiction’s own masthead, water 
marks and any other authentication options. 
Ballot-on-demand printers could also be helpful in supporting requirements for the 
large number of ballot styles required in most early voting centers.
BOD printing could also be done at a county level for absentee ballots, facilitating even 
more inclusive alternative-language support.
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10. Access to Voting in Alternative Languages 
For many voters, successfully voting can be a confusing and daunting challenge even 
in their native language, so it is important to simplify the voting process in many 
ways, including by supplying all voters with materials in their preferred language. The 
numbers of voters needing access to voting systems with alternative languages is very 
large, even when compared to the number of voters with disability-related access 
needs. Accommodating access to voting systems in alternative languages has relatively 
clean and simple technical solutions and does not need to become a messy nationwide 
issue. It does need a major effort on the part of advocates and election officials to 
become well informed and press for available good solutions. 
Some advocates for alternative-language voting access have the mistaken impression 
that DRE voting systems are the best and only way to handle alternative-language 
voting needs. This is simply wrong, for two main reasons. First, computerized BMDs 
can offer flexible alternative language interface options for voting systems just as 
well as those offered by DRE systems. Second, states, such as California, have already 
demonstrated that it is possible to provide many choices for alternative languages on 
optical-scan paper ballot systems. 
Some of the following approaches can be easily implemented to make it even easier to 
support rich multilingual voting diversity on optical ballot systems.
10.1 Bilingual Ballot Systems 
Bilingual pape r ballot or bilingual VVPAT systems can facilitate alternative-language 
voting, prevent many security and privacy exposures, and assure that the audit trail can 
be read in English. 
To do this, bilingual optical-scan paper ballots could be given to all voters. Every voter 
could select which second language they want on their ballot. Voters who choose to 
vote in English would get a ballot with a randomly selected second language. All ballots 
would have each item printed in English and one other language. This bilingual ballot 
system prevents many security and privacy exposures. No one could look at a ballot and 
know the voter’s language needs. This approach also assures that the audit can be read 
in English, while not crowding the ballot with copies of many different languages.
Bilingual ballots also seem to be the best way to address multiple language needs for 
absentee ballots. Such a bilingual ballot approach can work well with but does not 
require ballot-on-demand printer systems.
VVPAT systems could also use basically the same bilingual printout approach to 
accommodating multiple language needs of voters while still allowing paper-trail 
auditing in English.
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A different approach for handling multiple-language paper-ballot voting needs 
incorporates multilingual marking-guide booklets with perforated templates for 
marking common English language paper ballots through holes in different language 
templates. The paper ballot would have only English printed on it, and each template 
page of the booklet would have the ballot text in a different language (and include 
holes for the marking positions). You could slip the English paper ballot underneath your 
chosen language template page (or inside, if pages are sleeves), and then you could 
mark the English paper ballot through the holes in the template. 
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11. Other Factors That Limit Access to Voting
The design of voting terminals is not the only thing that determines whether voters with 
disabilities will be able to vote successfully. Some other factors include:
Access to sample ballots and other election information.
Access to the voter registration process.
Being homebound or institutionalized.
Access to information identifying the location of the proper polling place.
Transportation to the polling place.
Physical access into and around the polling place.
Lack of interpreters for sign or other languages.
Requirement of poll-worker assistance to switch between visual and audio 
access modes on most DRE voting systems.
Lack of the required technical expertise and special training for the poll workers.
Ergonomic problems such as placement and adjustment of voting-system 
controls and displays.
Requirements for photo IDs, driver’s licenses or other IDs that may cause 
nondrivers or other potential voters to be disenfranchised.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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12. Recommendations
12.1 The Notion That It Is Possible to Have One Ideal Voting Machine for 
All Should Be Seen as Impractical
There will never be a single perfect voting machine that has everything needed to 
meet everyone’s accessible-voting needs. However, using one type of system for ballot 
recording media, ballot collection and ballot tabulation for the majority of voters and a 
different type of system for voters with disabilities or minority language needs is known 
as “ballot segregation”. This does not include the devices and methods used to privately 
select votes and mark ballots. For obvious reasons, voting systems should not use ballot 
segregation.
12.2 Use Blended Systems
The best currently available solution to meet security and accessibility needs is a blend 
or mix that would include most of the following:
Optical-scan ballots and precinct scanners.
Ballot-on-demand printers.
Bilingual paper ballots.
Electronic ballot-marking devices with accessible paper ballot scan and 
verification.
Tactile ballots with verification wands (if properly designed and produced with 
good quality) for accessible absentee and deaf-blind voting.
Simple digital electronic magnifier aids for the polling place.
12.3 Require Redesign to Simplify All Voting Systems
A major redesign and simplification of all voting systems and their components would 
also make blends of voting systems more practical for election officials, poll workers and 
voters.
12.4 Adopt Bilingual Ballot Systems 
Bilingual paper-ballot or bilingual VVPAT systems can facilitate preferred-language 
voting, prevent many security and privacy exposures, and assure that the audit trail can 
be read in English. 
To support alternative-language needs, precinct scanners and other voting machines 
should also include international icons or multilingual labels and displays. 
•
•
•
•
•
•
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12.5 Adopt Ballot-on-Demand Printing Systems
Ballot-on-demand printing with special paper and standard printers would reduce the 
costs of paper ballots, assure a reliable and steady supply of multilingual ballots, and 
prevent waste of surplus ballots. 
12.6 Do More to Limit Eavesdropping in the Polling Place
All paper-ballot printing, scanning and verifying systems should support and be 
supplied with ballot privacy sleeves to help assure vote privacy.
Eavesdropping in the polling place has become a much more significant threat to 
privacy due to compact digital cameras, cell phone cameras and the use of visual 
displays that can show one’s ballot at a glance (especially the large, high-contrast text 
needed by some voters with low vision). Voting booths need much better privacy 
shields and curtains, and poll workers need to be more careful about how they set up 
and orient the screens and printers in the polling place. Additionally, polling places 
need to have tight controls on the use of cell phones, digital cameras, personal digital 
assistants and other electronic equipment that might be used for eavesdropping.
12.7 Improve Accessibility Interfaces on Voting Systems
Despite the VVSG’s more explicit standards for better accessibility features and 
functions, many vendors have not yet managed to deliver dual-switch input controls, 
simultaneous audio-video output, enhanced video display controls, and other essential 
and manageable improvements to voting-machine accessibility. 
Now that the HAVA-driven 2006 buying frenzy is mostly over, it’s time to make all the 
voting systems truly accessible and secure and phase out any access-inflexible and 
obsolete voting systems. (See Appendix E: Some Suggestions for Improving Access on 
Current Systems.)
We should be demanding much better accessibility for virtually all voters with 
disabilities or special needs. We should not say, as some have, that because a voting 
machine may work for certain voters who are blind, it can be assumed to be good 
enough for everybody. As an example: A friend with low vision found the Sequoia 
Edge II audio access system so frustrating to use that she had to have her partner who 
is totally blind do her voting for her, using the Sequoia audio access. This was largely 
because she needs simultaneous audio and video display output, and the Sequoia Edge 
II system has not been able to supply that essential accommodation. 
To begin accommodating voters who are profoundly deaf-blind, we should immediately 
push for well-designed tactile ballot-marking aids with mark-sensing verification 
wands. Tactile ballot-marking systems should be considered to be aids rather than 
replacements for all other accessible voting systems. 
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Institutionalized or homebound voters should not be excluded from voting privately 
and independently just because they may not be able to get to a polling place. We 
should have private absentee voting systems for voters with disabilities. These might 
use a blend of tactile ballots, remote telephone voting, vote-by-mail systems and 
mark-with-your-computer ballot systems.
Like handheld lenses, simplified digital electronic magnifier aids should be available 
in every polling place to help voters with low vision read voter information materials, 
as well as help some to mark paper ballots, including provisional paper ballots. 
Manufacturers of electronic video magnifiers should be encouraged to develop and 
supply simple, easy-to-use electronic video magnifier aids that are configured to 
simplify their operation for polling-place requirements.
Ballot boxes and precinct scanners should have input slots that have legroom below to 
accommodate voters in wheelchairs. Precinct scanners should also include international 
icons or multilingual labels and displays. They should also include private audible output 
to indicate scanning results such as “accepted”, “undervoted” and “overvoted” in the 
same language as that in which the ballot was voted.
Electronic BMDs (including former DREs converted to BMDs with ballot printers) should 
include a voter-selectable control option to automatically deposit the printed ballot into 
a ballot box or drawer without requiring manual handling by the voter.
12.8 Verify Operation of Accessible Audio Output 
To increase the integrity of voting systems using synthetic text -to speech (TTS) for 
their accessible audio output, any TTS pronouncing-exceptions dictionaries should be 
made accessibly available for public inspection. Additionally, for voting systems using 
either human or synthetic TTS audio access, polling-place procedures should include 
at least one sighted person check to make sure that votes on the paper records match 
the spoken choices of any audio access output. This print-audio correspondence check 
should be done at the start of the election day, as well as at random times during the 
day.
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13. Conclusions
The technology for inexpensively providing good accessibility to voting systems has 
been commonly available for more than a decade, and it can and should be applied 
to all modern voting systems. A completely new and redesigned generation of voting 
systems is needed. To accommodate a broad range of disability access needs, voting 
systems must be designed, from the beginning, with security, accessibility, principles of 
universal interface design and good human factors in mind. It is not likely that any single 
voting-machine design can ever meet all the complex and sometimes contradictory 
needs and requirements of all voters.
Hybrid DRE-VVPAT designs and their accessibility Band-Aids will soon need to be phased 
out entirely. Adding VVPAT roll printers to currently fielded DREs will necessitate later 
having to tack on an awkward scanner-verifier capability to make verification of the 
printout even partly accessible. 
If counties insist on making some use of their currently fielded DRE systems, they should 
not attempt to add tourniquets such as VVPAT roll-to-roll printers. 
Converting DREs to BMDs only by adding cheap cut-sheet printers without verification 
scanner capabilities may become widespread but would result in unacceptable systems 
with major ballot-handling privacy exposure risks, as well as systems without reliably 
accessible paper ballot verification.
DRE systems already in the field should be used only if: 
They incorporate an accessible and truly verifiable paper ballot printer-scanner-
verifier that converts them into more reliable ballot-marking devices.
Their accessibility is substantially improved to fully comply with all the new 
VVSG accessibility requirements.
Generally, there is an obvious need to adopt a better forum and methodology for 
exploring the full voting-system architecture, creatively considering alternatives, 
weighing complex issues (such as security, practical economics, voter comfort and limits 
to absolute access for all), and building a more productive and consistent consensus.
Finally, the author believes that blended systems, with optical-scan ballots, precinct 
scanners and accessible BMDs similar to the AutoMARK, such as now used in New 
Mexico, are the best and most likely solution for the foreseeable future.
 
1.
2.
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Appendix A: Abbreviations and Acronyms
ATL: Accredited testing laboratories 
BMD: Ballot-marking device
CCOS: Central-count optical scan
COTS: Commercial off-the-shelf
DRE: Direct-recording electronic
EAC: Election Assistance Commission 
EVS: Electronic voting system
FFBS: Full-face ballot system
HAVA: Help America Vote Act
ITA: Independent testing authority (private lab)
NASED: National Association of State Election Directors 
NASS: National Association of Secretaries of State
NOD: National Organization on Disability
NVRA: National Voter Registration Act 
Opscan: Optical scan
PCOS: Precinct-count optical scan
TBS: Tactile ballot system
TBMD: Tactile ballot-marking device
VBM: Vote -by mail
VRA: Voting Rights Act of 1965
VVPAT: Voter-verified paper audit trail
VVPR: Voter-verified paper record
VVSG: Voluntary Voting System Guidelines
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Appendix B: Personal Experiences in Voting on the Sequoia 
Edge II DREs
I have attempted to vote on Sequoia Edge II DRE machines in five elections. 
1. March 2004
The first time, in March 2004, the poll workers were never able to get any of the 
machines at our polling place rebooted with the audio-assist feature working. After 45 
minutes of struggling with the systems, we gave up and I had to have someone else do 
my voting for me. Clearly, these Sequoia Edge DREs were not designed correctly to be 
operated by poll workers lacking high levels of technical sophistication. 
2. November 2004 
My experience voting on the Sequoia Edge II DRE with the audio-assist feature in the 
November 2004 election illustrates the problems faced by voters who are blind or have 
low vision when attempting to vote on Sequoia Edge II DREs. 
2.1 Starting Up: Reboot; Finding a Chair; Intermittent Sound; Sample 
Ballot in Wrong Order
After signing in and getting my voter smart card, I had to wait eight minutes for officials 
to manage to reboot the audio voting machine. The polling officers had been using it for 
visual touch-screen voting, as there was a very long line and just five voting machines 
for our combined two-precinct polling place. 
I had my notes in braille. Because there was no table surface for the notes, the poll 
workers had to find me a chair so I could read my notes with the braille on my lap.
The volume control on the front of the Sequoia Edge II keypad was not working well and 
resulted in scratchy and intermittent sound. By the time I got the volume set to where 
I could hear it, the introductory message had already finished the English instructions 
and was off into other languages. I was not sure what I should do, so I finally gave up 
and pressed the Select button several times. This eventually got me to the language 
menu, where I was able to select English and get started with my ballot. 
Once I got started, the first major problem I had was that the ballot on the Sequoia Edge 
II voting machine was not in the same order as the printed sample ballot. When my 
wife pointed this out to the chief poll worker, the poll worker was surprised to see the 
difference and said maybe that would explain why it was taking most voters longer than 
expected to vote. Because my notes were done in the order of the sample ballot, I had 
to do a lot of hopping around in my notes and be very thorough and careful listening 
to the machine. In contrast to what we had been told, the list of candidate names was 
spoken in alphabetical order.
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2.2 Reviewing: Can’t Stop It; It Reads Everything
It took me 30 minutes to work my way through the ballot and make my selections. After 
that, I had quite a bit of trouble getting into the review mode to get a full list of my 
selections. When I did, it went on and on, for 23 minutes, like a long, uncontrolled drink 
from a fire hose. 
The review function read each item, and then at the very end said what my selection 
was for that item. It even threw in the details of what the fiscal impact would be and 
took forever. This is completely backward. It should announce the name of the item, 
then state my selection, and then read the rest of the information for that item. Also, I 
should have the control to press the arrow key to move forward or backward through 
the items without having to listen to all the text about every item. 
When I did find that I had made a mistake in my selections, I had to wait until the end of 
the whole review process to correct it, instead of being able to stop, make the change 
and then continue with the review where I left off. I did not want to abort the ballot-
verification review to make a correction and then have to start the long, tedious review 
all over again from the beginning. 
2.3 Time-Outs: Dumped Back to the Language Selection Menu 
At one point, as I was nearing the end of the ballot, I was dumped back to the language 
selection menu. I found out later that this was because I hadn’t hit a key in quite a while 
and the Sequoia Edge II has a time-out function. I hadn’t hit a key for a while because it 
was taking a very long time to read out the ballot summary! 
This is terrible human-factors design. If a system is trying to present a helpful prompt 
when it senses an overly long delayed response from the user, it should never bounce 
the user to a different place in the menu system. It might prompt the user, but it should 
then leave them at their previous position to minimize confusion. Furthermore, the 
time-out should not begin until the system has finished reading out its message — in 
this case, after the whole ballot review. For a scary minute, I was afraid I had just lost my 
ballot and would have to start all over. I re-selected “English”; pressed the Select key 
several times; and, fortunately, was returned to my previous location in the ballot.
2.3 Corrections: Have to Unselect First
When I later attempted to change one of my selections from “no” to “yes,” the machine 
would not let me select “yes” until I had first gone to the unwanted choice and 
deselected it. This was very awkward and confusing. It is poor human factors design for 
anybody, but especially for those using the audio-assist feature. Many voters using the 
audio-assist feature would not be able to navigate this difficult review and correction 
procedure. 
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2.5 Sound Levels: Not Normalized
An additional frustration was that the volume on some of the messages was so much 
lower than the rest of the messages that I had to turn up the volume, repeat the 
message and then turn the volume back down before proceeding. The volume on all 
the messages should be normalized to make them the same. 
2.6 Takes Too Long to Vote
From the time I signed in and got my voter smart card, it took eight minutes to reboot 
the machine as an audio voting machine, 30 minutes to make my choices, 23 minutes 
to review and verify, and another four minutes to make a correction and record my 
vote. Not counting the hour I had waited in line, it took me about 65 minutes to mark 
and record my ballot. It would have taken even longer if I had been willing to wait, as 
prompted, until the end of each message to push the Select button. The messages 
mislead some voters because they say something like “At the end of this message, you 
can press the....” This implies that you are supposed to wait until the speech message 
finishes.
I must emphasize that my ability to navigate this process at all was due to my familiarity 
with computers and computer technology. I doubt that many voters who are blind or 
have low vision would have been able to wade through all of that complex process.
2.7 No Way to Get Help
There were at least two times when I wanted to ask for help from the poll workers. 
One was during the confusion I encountered because of the difference between the 
printed sample ballot and the DRE ballot. The other time was near the end of my ballot 
marking, when I had a lot of trouble getting the review started and then was trying to 
find and change a mistake I found during the review. Because the poll workers would 
not be able to read anything on the blanked-out visual display on my system and didn’t 
have any way to join me in listening to the audio output of the machine, I knew that I 
couldn’t get much help from them (even though our head polling officer seemed very 
knowledgeable and helpful).
2.8 Incompetently Designed Audio Interface
As an expert in the design of audio access technology, it is my opinion that the Sequoia 
Edge II system was incompetently designed. The Sequoia Edge II audio review process is 
totally unacceptable and would cause most voters with disabilities to skip the review.
3. November 2005 
In November 2005, I once again had a frustrating experience attempting to vote with 
the Sequoia Edge II machine. 
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3.1 Starting Up: Poll Workers Couldn’t Reboot Into Audio Mode
The polling officers (who were very pleasant) thought they had booted the machine into 
audio mode first thing in the morning, but they had not. Once they realized it was not in 
audio mode, they could not figure out how to reboot the DRE into audio mode. 
After my wife read their manual and figured out the correct audio boot-up process, 
she finally managed to get the machine properly rebooted and talking for them. This 
rebooting fiasco took 18 very frustrating minutes.
3.2 Eight-Choice Ballot Took 32 Minutes
After the Sequoia Edge II voting machine finally started talking, it took me about six 
minutes to fill out the ballot, seven minutes to review my vote, and another minute to 
record my ballot and finish. Total time in front of the machine was 32 minutes. Luckily, it 
was a short ballot, with just eight choices. 
Clearly, if I hadn’t been very tenacious and hadn’t taken my own computer expert along 
when I went to vote, I wouldn’t have been able to vote privately.
3.3 Bad Wording and Bad Recording
After I initially made all my ballot choices, the Sequoia Edge II machine prompted me 
with a message that said something like “You are finished voting” instead of “If you are 
finished voting . . .,” which is likely to cause some voters to walk away before their votes 
have been properly recorded. 
It should more obviously prompt with something like “If you are done making your 
choices, press Select to record your vote.” Many of the factory built-in prompts of the 
Sequoia Edge II audio-assist feature are similarly poorly worded and misleading or 
confusing. 
Additionally, understanding the locally recorded November 2005 ballot messages was 
very difficult because they had used a reader who had a very thick foreign accent. 
3.4 Many Voters Would Not Be Able to Complete a Vote: Confusing 
Menus; Takes Too Long
I must emphasize that my ability to independently navigate the Sequoia Edge II voting 
processes at all was due to my familiarity with computers and computer technology. 
Many voters with visual or cognitive impairments would not be able to successfully 
navigate the Sequoia Edge II’s confusing hierarchical menu systems.
Additionally, as one familiar with the technology, I was more likely than the typical voter 
using audio access to be able to figure out how Sequoia audio features worked and 
were structured, yet I encountered considerable difficulty that made the voting process 
slow, tedious and frustrating. 
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Many voters forced to use the audio-assist features might be embarrassed to tie up a 
voting machine for long periods or not have sufficient patience, and therefore decide 
not to vote the entire ballot or not to fully review their selections before casting their 
ballot. 
4. June 2006
The June 6, 2006, primary election in Santa Clara County was my fourth opportunity to 
attempt to vote on the Sequoia Edge II electronic voting systems. 
4.1 Starting Up: Card Has to Be Programmed Correctly; Still Have to 
Reboot to Get Audio Mode
For 12 minutes, the poll workers struggled with trying to get the system talking. 
By watching the screen for them, my wife was able to tell them it wasn’t setting up 
correctly. The poll workers tried repeatedly to program the voter ID card properly so it 
would cause my voting machine to talk. 
Fortunately, I remembered that at the last Voter Access Advisory Committee meeting, 
a member of the registrar of voters’ staff told me that the Sequoia ID card encoder did 
not show a menu choice for the audio voting mode. Our poll workers did not know that 
just before the final step of encoding the ID card, they were supposed to issue a special 
menu command to bring up a hidden menu for selecting audio access mode.
After I explained this trick for properly using the card encoder, they were eventually 
persuaded to try it and were finally able to make me an ID card that actually worked 
and brought the machine up in the audio voting mode. What did happen, and what 
will happen in the general elections, to all the voters who were not told or did not 
remember enough to convincingly tell their poll workers how to properly encode their 
cards for audio access mode? They will not be able to vote using the Sequoia Edge II 
machines. 
4.2 Almost an Hour to Vote: Reviewing Still Takes Too Long; Write-Ins 
Are Complicated and Tedious
After 12 minutes waiting for my Sequoia Edge II machine to be properly configured in 
audio mode, it took an additional 31 minutes for me to navigate my way through the 
ballot-marking procedure. It then took eight more minutes for it to play out the ballot 
review. 
At this point, I decided that I needed to change one of my votes to a write-in, and that 
complicated and tedious procedure took another seven minutes.
By the time the Sequoia Edge II system printed the paper trail and then spit out my voter 
ID card, I had spent a total of 59.5 minutes trying to vote privately.
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4.3 Other Problems: Card Slot Hard to Find; Distorted Recordings; Time-
Outs
There were several other problems I encountered while trying to vote on this Sequoia 
Edge II voting system. The voter ID card slot was hard to find, as it was positioned so 
low on the front bottom of the machine and lacked a good tactile guide bezel around 
its opening. The locally recorded audio messages were distorted and of poor quality 
from the reader blowing on the microphone throughout the recording. At least three 
times while I was voting, the Sequoia Edge II timed out and put me back in the language 
selection menu, where it then required that I press the Select key twice to exit and 
return to my previous position in the ballot.
4.4 VVPAT Not Accessible: Doesn’t Even Allow the Voter to Try to Verify
When the system printed my vote on the VVPAT roll-to-roll printer, I asked my wife to 
take a look at it to verify my vote for me. It turns out that if I am using the audio access 
feature, the printer prints the whole ballot in one shot and clears it out of the viewing 
window, without any break to stop and permit me to have a sighted friend read and 
verify the paper trail for me. When sighted voters are printing their ballot on the VVPAT, 
it prints only a single page at a time and then pauses for the user to press a button to 
make it print the next page, after the voter is ready.
Because the manufacturer of the Sequoia Edge II system thinks voters who are blind 
will not be able to read and verify the paper trail themselves, it incorrectly assumes that 
all audio voters want the whole ballot printed out without any pauses for viewing by 
anyone.
Voters with disabilities are more likely to have electronic voting systems misrepresent 
their vote, accidentally or maliciously, so they have even greater need than other voters 
to accessibly verify the paper record.
What I have heard from other voters, even sighted voters, is that they have often caught 
ballot-marking mistakes in the review or verification processes. It is clear from this 
and from my own experience that we really have to go through both the review and 
verification processes in order to make sure our ballots are accurate. The complicated 
and tedious review processes of most DRE voting systems are likely to cause most voters 
with disabilities to give up and skip the review.
4.5 Out of Service: What if the One Accessible Machine Breaks?
One of the Sequoia Edge II voting machines in our polling place was broken and taken 
out of service. Luckily for me, it was not the audio access voting machine. 
5. November 2006 
The November 2006 election was the fifth election in which I attempted to vote on a 
Sequoia Edge II. 
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5.1 Starting Up: Poll Workers Asked for Special Training; Rebooting Is 
Silent and Takes a Long Time
It took an hour and 17 minutes at the machine, not counting the time in line. This time, 
the poll workers actually knew how to set up the audio mode. They told me they asked 
for special training on the audio setup in their poll-worker training class because they 
“knew that a blind engineer” was going to be trying to vote there again. This makes only 
2 out of 5 times that the poll workers have been able to successfully set up the audio 
voting mode for me by themselves. 
It took about 8 minutes for the system to load the audio mode, all without any audible 
beeps or status indicators until it was up. I’ve heard its taken 15 minutes for some to load 
the audio. 
There was no loud, publicly audible sound to alert the poll workers that the machine 
was reloading or finished booting up. For obvious security reasons, there ought to be 
loud public sounds at reboot and whenever a vote is cast. This is especially important 
now that it has been documented that voters can vote multiple times on Sequoia DRE 
systems by pressing the reset button on the back of the machine each time just after 
they have finished casting their vote.
5.2 New Keypad Not Much Better Than Old: No Up and Down; Multi-
Modal keys; Hard to Hold
In this November 2006 election, Santa Clara County’s Sequoia systems had the newer 
V5 keypad with rate and volume control buttons. I was disappointed to find that the 
navigation controls were just as bad as on the previous keypad. Unlike what some 
people had claimed, there were no up and down navigation control keys, just left and 
right arrow keys (for “previous” and “next”). 
Because of these missing key functions, the Select key must be used multi-modally, 
sometimes to select candidate choices and other times to navigate out of or into races. It 
isn’t clear to the user exactly when the Select key is changing its mode.
I had to remove the Velcro strap on the back of the keypad to be able to hold the keypad 
in one hand.
5.3 Time-Outs and Bad Human Factors: Poor Wording of Messages; Poor 
Speech Quality; Speed Increase Distortion
The time-out bug that bounces back into the language selection dialog was still there, 
as well as all the cognitive complexity and problems I found in the primary election. 
An example of the system’s confusing and poor message wording:
“Press the round red Select button to exit this recording.” The use of “exit this recording” 
is quite poor from a human-factors perspective, as users don’t think in terms of exiting 
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anything they didn’t intentionally enter and are confused because they didn’t think they 
were doing any recording from which they needed to exit.
The prompts still referred to the keys only by color and shape and did not reference 
them by position on the keypad.
The speech quality actually seemed to be worse than before. There seemed to be only 
three speed settings, and the fastest speed had chipmunk-like frequency distortion, 
rather than using VSC (variable speed control) compression to increase or decrease the 
speech rate. The speed-increase range was not enough to really speed up my vote-
casting time. 
I found that the audio messages seemed to be more distorted and noisier than the 
previous time I voted on the Sequoia Edge II. I even had my wife listen to the audio to 
confirm that the quality was poor.
5.4 Other Problems: No Simultaneous Audio and Video; No VVPAT 
Access; Voter ID Cards Time Out
The video screen was still blanked during audio mode and did not support 
simultaneous audio-video display. 
There was a VVPAT with a privacy cover flap but no audio access for voters with visual 
impairments.
An additional problem with the voter ID cards was that they timed out on my wife and 
others who were waiting for a turn at the voting machines. The 10- or 15-minute time-
out on the cards is much too short.
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Appendix C: Detailed Lack of Accessibility on Voting Systems
1. The Systems Require Poll-Worker Intervention
Most DRE voting systems, such as the Diebold AccuVote TSX, Sequoia Edge II and ES&S 
iVotronic, do not permit voters with disabilities to select their audio and visual display 
modes by themselves. Instead, they must get a poll worker to select the access modes 
for them. This requires that the voter with disabilities is aware of, and knows how to ask 
for, the proper audio-visual mode, and it requires that the poll workers know how to 
properly select the mode for the voter. 
The absence of this technology to allow immediate use and adaptation by people with 
disabilities without third-party intervention causes several problems for people with 
visual and other disabilities. One is the total lack of privacy, as the voter is required to 
inform election officials in front of other people of his or her disability and the need for 
assistance, denying that voter essential privacy in very personal matters. This problem 
is particularly acute for people who prefer to keep secret the fact that they have visual 
or reading impairments or other special needs, such as requirements for an alternative 
language.
Choosing to use access features should not require poll-worker intervention such as 
reprogramming the voter identification card (as is required by many DRE systems) or 
rebooting the system (as has been required by others, such as the older Sequoia Edge II 
systems). 
1.1 Synchronized Audio-Visual Access Mode Should Be the Default
Synchronized audio-visual access mode should usually be the default access mode for 
all electronic voting systems. The selection of access options, such as larger or smaller 
text size, should be available at all times, for adjustment by the voters. 
There is no good reason that voting systems could not have personal configuration 
abilities for selecting access input controls and output media settings. 
1.2 Poll Workers Don’t Know How to Set Up the Correct Mode
In practice, the lack of technical expertise and adequate training of poll workers 
has meant that many voters with visual impairments have not been aware of the 
audio-visual access mode or have been unable to get their poll workers to set up their 
electronic voting systems to use it. 
In an article she sent to the American Council of the Blind Discussion List and other 
groups, Karyn Campbell described her first experience voting with a Diebold AccuVote 
TSX machine, in the March 2006 Illinois primary. She explained that she asked for an 
audio ballot and had to have poll workers reprogram her voter ID card, as it did not 
set up the Diebold AccuVote TSX properly the first time she tried it. When she put the 
reprogrammed card in the Diebold AccuVote TSX machine, it started working in audio 
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mode but with the video output in the wrong mode. Not wanting to push her luck, she 
gave up and went ahead and voted with the Diebold AccuVote TSX machine, although it 
was not configured as she wanted.
In my first voting experience with the Sequoia Edge II, the poll workers were never able 
to get the DRE working in audio mode, even after 45 minutes of reading manuals and 
calling voter tech-support service centers. Out of the five times I’ve voted on Sequoia 
Edge II systems in elections, the poll workers have been able to get the systems into 
audio voting mode, by themselves, twice.
2 Learning How to Use the Systems, and Getting Help
The current state of adaptive technology allows for people with disabilities to do 
“discovery” and “personal adaptation” on well-designed computer systems without 
major intervention by an assistant (for example, going to a computer system and 
immediately beginning to privately adapt it for personal use). Just as voters can select a 
language on these systems by themselves, they should be able to select audio mode or 
video viewing enhancements by themselves, without the intervention of poll workers or 
other third parties. Voters should be able to figure out how to use the systems without 
previous training and without significant instruction by a poll worker. 
Additionally, most of the voting systems need but do not have practice modes 
with a simplified example mini ballot, to give the voter who needs it a comfortable 
opportunity to independently figure out how to view, mark, review and correct their 
choices.
Most of the current voting systems should but do not have a “request help” key or other 
control to discretely summon assistance from a poll worker.
3. The Major DREs’ Failure to Accommodate Severe Dexterity Disabilities
For a voting system to comport with federal accessibility requirements, a voting 
machine’s adaptive technology must accommodate not only voters who are blind or 
have low vision but also people with physical disabilities, such as dexterity disabilities, as 
well as people with hearing impairments or cognitive disabilities.
3.1 No Interface With Dual-Switch Controls
Adaptive technologies for people with various manual keyboard impairments and/or 
complete inability to use hand controls currently exist, and these technologies are 
affordable and readily adaptable to voting machines. Such technologies include head 
switches, foot switches, giant jelly switches and sip-and-puff switches. The only practical 
way to connect these adaptive devices to a voting machine is through a standard 
1/8-inch phone-plug dual-switch interface. 
Voters with manual dexterity disabilities who need dual-switch adaptive devices cannot 
currently plug those devices into many DRE voting systems (such as the ES&S iVotronic) 
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to gain control over the system. Voters with manual dexterity disabilities who are unable 
to use the voting systems’ manual selection buttons or touch screen are thus prevented 
from privately casting their vote. These defects deny voters with severe manual 
dexterity disabilities the same opportunity for access and participation (including 
privacy and independence) enjoyed by other voters who use these voting systems. 
As suggested in the Trace Center (University of Wisconsin at Madison) proposal for an 
ideal voting system, all voting systems should have a 1/8-inch phone jack (separate 
from the headphone jack) on the keypad for attaching a sip-and-puff or other standard 
switched input-control device.
3.2 Forcing Audio-Only Output
Another problem is that systems may force voters with severe motor impairments to 
vote as though they were also blind. For example, the sip-and-puff option proposed for 
the Sequoia Edge II works only with audio output, without any visual display. 
The audio orientation instructions and prompts of the Sequoia Edge II are for using the 
tactile keypad and are totally inappropriate and unhelpful for users of dual-switch input 
controls. Because Sequoia’s sip-and-puff switch controls only give voters the “forward” 
and “select” control input functions, they do not have access to the “help” functions, 
and voters are not able to reasonably back up to hear something again or to make 
corrections. 
This ill-considered attempt to claim a sip-and-puff interface is bogus and not what the 
access industry would normally consider to be a dual-switch or sip-and-puff interface. 
Normally, a dual-switch control interface to a system with a visual display would permit 
users to select items on the visual display instead of forcing them to use an exclusively 
audio output system built for users who are blind. A system such as Sequoia’s proposed 
token dual-switch interface represents a poorly considered, tacked-on approach to 
accessible voting-system design. It will not functionally meet the access needs of most 
voters with severe motor impairments.
3.3 Annoying Time-Outs
The no-key-pressed time-outs that are so annoying and confusing for voters with visual 
impairments on DRE systems such as the Sequoia II are likely to happen even more 
often to most voters with severe motor impairments who are forced to use audio-only 
“access” output systems and awkward keypads.
3.4 No Interface With Computerized Communicators
The major DRE voting machines do not support computerized communicators such as 
head-mounted laser pointers, eye gaze, eye blink and electronic lap-tray puck-selector 
systems because they do not support serial or other standard input-output interfaces. 
Therefore, voters whose dexterity disability requires them to use adaptive technologies 
are not afforded “the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy 
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and independence) as for other voters” on these voting systems. Nor can many voters 
with such a physical disability “privately and independently receive instruction, make 
selections, and cast a ballot.”
3.5 Hard-to-Handle Voter ID Cards
The Diebold AccuVote TSX and Sequoia Edge II voting machines require voters to insert 
and remove the voter identification card, which is much smaller than the AutoMARK’s 
paper ballot and for some people even more difficult than independently removing the 
ballot in its privacy sleeve. 
4. Inadequate Keypads
4.1 Cannot be Operated With Only One Hand
As specified in the Section 508 Accessibility Guidelines of the Rehabilitation Act, 
“Controls and keys shall be operable with one hand and shall not require tight grasping, 
pinching, or twisting of the wrist.” Many voters with motor impairments cannot hold 
tactile keypads such as the Diebold AccuVote TSX or Sequoia Edge II tethered keypads in 
one hand while attempting to press keys with the other. 
Unlike smaller and more ergonomically designed single-hand-operated remote controls 
for television sets, the large size and form factor of the Sequoia Edge II and Diebold 
AccuVote TSX keypads do not facilitate their use as a keypad held in a single hand and 
operated by the thumb of the same hand.
The Sequoia Edge II tethered keypad is so bulky that many voters, not to mention those 
with dexterity impairments, find it awkward to hold and operate, even with both hands. 
Because the Sequoia Edge II has no built-in keypad cradle or place to park the keypad, 
a standing voter is forced to try to hold the keypad in one hand and operate it with the 
other.
The challenge faced by many voters with motor impairments who are trying to use 
the tactile keypad or touch-screen controls of electronic voting systems may be better 
appreciated if you imagine yourself trying to operate the touch screens, the keypad of 
the Sequoia Edge II or the telephone-style keypad of the Diebold AccuVote TSX with the 
heel of your hand, your elbow, a rod held in your armpit or a small baseball bat held in 
your mouth. 
4.2 Confusing Keys
Proper accessible keypads should have a few large keys spaced far apart. Additionally, 
the keys should have high-contrast coloring, true braille and large print labels, and 
unique tactile shapes, all chosen to make them simple to discover, identify intuitively, 
remember easily and locate quickly. 
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Although Diebold’s own literature represents the TSX’s tethered keypad as a “tactile 
keypad,” its telephone-style keypad with a bump on the 5 key is not what the access 
industry considers a tactile keypad. Its keys are much too small and close together for 
most people with major motor impairments to be able to use. There are too many keys, 
including keys that apparently have no obvious function. 
The braille labels on the keys of many of the Sequoia Edge II keypads are difficult to 
read. They do not use standard braille dot spacing. They are also so close to the back 
edge of the keys that it is difficult for many braille readers to get their fingertips onto the 
dots to feel them. 
4.3 Other Keypad Problems
There is no place to leave the Sequoia Edge II keypad when you are through voting. I 
have found Sequoia Edge II voting machines in polling places with the keypads and 
earphones left hanging over the edge by their cables and dragging on the floor. 
Although it has reasonably separated keys on its front panel, the ES&S iVotronic also 
needs but does not have a detachable keypad that can be positioned on the lap, hand 
or other convenient place if required. 
5. Inadequate Audio Interfaces for Voters Who are Blind or Have Low 
Vision (and Others Who are Forced to Vote as if They Were Blind)
The major DRE voting systems, from my direct experience, have no more than poorly 
functioning and ineffective audio interfaces. 
5.1 Inadequate Speech Controls
5.1.1 Volume 
Many DREs, such as the ES&S iVotronic, do not have a built-in volume control. The ES&S 
iVotronic DRE headsets are of poor quality, and the inline volume slide control makes 
the sound scratchy. There is also no tactile indication of where the volume control 
should be set for normal operation. Consequently, I missed the initial instruction 
message of the system before I figured out how to get the volume set properly. 
Having the volume control built in is important for giving the system the ability to 
reset volume and rate at the beginning of a session for each voter. This helps to prevent 
painful volume blasting or missed overly quiet messages at the beginning of the audio 
voting session.
An additional frustration I and others have encountered with the speech on many of 
the DREs is that the volume on some of the messages is so much lower than the rest of 
the messages that we have to turn up the volume, try to make it repeat the message 
and then turn the volume back down before proceeding. There are simple methods 
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available for making audio recordings with normalized volume levels.. This should be 
done for all messages.
In order to provide accessibility for people with modest hearing impairments, all 
these electronic voting systems should have a “boosted” high volume capability. The 
absence of such a high output capability on these electronic systems also means that 
the systems are inaccessible for some audio-using voters with significant hearing 
impairments.
5.1.2 Speech Rate Control 
Many systems, such as the ES&S iVotronic DRE, lack any sort of voter-adjustable “speed” 
or speech rate control for the audio output. This is important for the elderly and people 
with learning disabilities, cognitive disabilities or other special needs who need to listen 
to the instructions and ballot selections at a slower rate than the default rate set by the 
system, while other voters cannot stand to listen to tediously slow speech. 
Voice speed control is standard adaptive technology that has been around for many 
years. It can be easily implemented and commonly has been implemented in computer 
systems, even including some other electronic voting systems.
5.2 Awkward Keypads
If you are forced to stand while voting with systems such as the Diebold AccuVote TSX 
or Sequoia Edge II, you will need to hold the tactile control keypad in your hands while 
operating it. Many of us who are braille readers have found it extremely difficult to read 
the braille notes we bring to the polling place while trying to also hold and operate a 
keypad. When reading braille, it is important to be able to keep one’s place by keeping 
one hand on the braille text. Having to switch back and forth between reading braille 
and holding the keypad is awkward, tedious and time-consuming, especially on long 
ballots. A lot of time is wasted each time we have to switch from holding the keypad to 
finding our place again in our braille notes. 
The Sequoia Edge II has no cradle or other place to park its keypad for single-handed 
operation. This makes it very awkward and difficult to read braille notes while using 
these keypads.
Unlike the keys of the Diebold AccuVote TSX keypad, keys that are used to move forward 
or backward in an audio ballot should have shapes that indicate direction (for example, 
arrow-shaped keys that intuitively indicate their direction through the ballot choices). 
5.3 Cognitively Difficult Menus
Many voters using the audio access feature of electronic voting systems such as the 
Diebold AccuVote TSX, Sequoia Edge II or ES&S iVotronic would not be able to navigate 
their cognitively difficult hierarchical menus and ballot-marking, review and correction 
systems. 
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For example, the iVotronic system uses a complicated and confusing process for 
navigating its hierarchical menu. Its poorly worded messages and complicated logic 
make it difficult to use, especially for the elderly and people with learning disabilities or 
cognitive impairments. A good example is that one button (the green, diamond-shaped 
button) is used on some screens to select a candidate but used elsewhere to move to 
the next race. A voting system with good human-factors design would not have more 
than one function per button, to avoid confusion and erroneous voting. 
The iVotronic’s navigation buttons also can cause confusion about what race you’re 
on and whom you’re voting for. For example the voter is initially placed in the top, or 
contest, level of the hierarchy and uses the yellow up and down arrow buttons to move 
from contest to contest and presses the green Select button to enter a race. 
Once in a particular race, the voter is at the bottom, or candidate, level of the hierarchy 
and again uses the up and down buttons to move from candidate to candidate. The 
voter presses the Select button to choose the candidate of their choice in that race. 
The problem is that if a voter moves past the last candidate in a race, the system 
immediately moves back up a level in the hierarchy to the contest level, positioned on 
the next race. If the voter realizes they have been automatically moved out of one race 
into another race, they would have to move back to the original race and again press the 
Select button to move back down into the candidate level. 
If the voter doesn’t comprehend what has happened in these situations (as is more likely 
with the elderly or people with learning disabilities, cognitive impairments, dyslexia or 
other special needs), the voter may be confused and think they are selecting a candidate 
for one race while the system has actually moved on to another race.
This confusing system of input controls and multilevel menu systems renders these 
DRE voting systems inaccessible to people with certain visual or cognitive impairments. 
These overwhelmingly complicated systems will also cause some people with 
disabilities to skip voting altogether, or to “short circuit” the process, such as by skipping 
the summary page. Incredibly, reading the summary page on the ES&S iVotronic is 
the only way for voters to confirm if they have undervoted (failed to vote for enough 
candidates for every race).
5.4 Slow and Tedious
Voting with audio output on the DRE voting systems is an excessively slow and tedious 
process. For example, in the case of the Diebold AccuVote TSX, this is due in large 
part to annoyingly long, pregnant pauses between phrases or messages. It also has 
overly verbose prompts that relentlessly keep repeating unnecessarily long messages 
throughout the ballot marking process. Moving back and forth between reviewing and 
making changes in the Diebold AccuVote TSX ballot can be a long, slow process because 
it usually requires many repeated pressings of the forward or backup keys. 
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The ballot review procedure on some systems, such as the Sequoia Edge II, is so poorly 
designed that most audio voters will not even attempt to review their ballots to check 
for accuracy. In my own experience with the Sequoia Edge II in an election, it took 23 
minutes just to review my ballot! The system had no pause control, and if I interrupted 
its long-winded read-out process to note or make a change, I was forced to restart the 
review read-out from the beginning of the ballot. 
5.5 Lack of Synchronized Audio and Video Outputs
When using audio output, the voter should always be able to turn off or on the visual 
display output and get audible acknowledgement of the display mode. This allows 
audio-only voters to have better privacy, if they want it, while allowing them to re-
enable the visual display whenever they desire. For example, it might be helpful for the 
voter to enable the visual display when asking for assistance from a sighted poll worker. 
Most of the DRE systems have no control to allow the voter to independently enable and 
disable the video display while using the audio voting feature. 
Voting systems such as the Sequoia Edge II and ES&S iVotronic have not allowed voters 
to use simultaneous and synchronized audio and video outputs. In other words, if these 
systems are in audio mode, the visual displays are disabled, and if the systems are in 
visual mode, the audio mode is disabled. 
5.5.1 Many Can’t Cope With Audio Alone
The failure to allow simultaneous and synchronized audio and visual outputs makes the 
systems inaccessible for voters with visual impairments who require or prefer to have 
audio assistance when viewing the video display of ballot selections. 
This problem is particularly acute for elderly voters who have developed severe visual 
impairments with age but are unfamiliar with, and unable to cope with, audio-only 
access technology. For these voters, neither a fully adjustable touch-screen display nor 
the audio access alternative is sufficient by itself. Rather, they require simultaneous 
output of both audio and video systems to vote independently and privately. 
5.5.2 Must be Synchronous Audio and Speech
Proper operation of simultaneous audio-visual access does not mean just having 
the audio/keypad and video/touch-screen systems working at the same time, as 
separate systems. Rather, it means they must be integrated in a synchronous fashion. 
In a synchronous audio-visual output system, selecting an item on the touch screen 
highlights it visually and synchronously speaks it through the audio output. Similarly, 
selecting an item with the keypad or switch input control alternatives should cause the 
item to be both spoken and visually highlighted. 
Empirical studies have confirmed that multi-sensory outputs are more accessible to 
voters with disabilities than single-sensory outputs. Indeed, these studies have shown 
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that multi-sensory output systems reduce error rates for all voters. Adaptive technology 
that allows for such multi-sensory outputs has been around for a long time, is affordable 
and is easily implemented in computer systems. Synchronized, redundant input controls 
and output media allow voters to play to their own strengths by focusing on the 
combination of controls and output that best fits their abilities. 
There is no good reason for electronic voting systems to lack such basic access 
technology.
5.6 Lack of Display Customization
Most of the DRE voting systems do not provide the combination of touch-screen display 
modification capabilities necessary to accommodate the full range of voter vision 
impairments. Some people with visual impairments prefer or need different colors or 
contrasts to read effectively. This adaptive technology has been around for 15 years or 
more, is affordable and is easily implemented in computer systems.
An adequate display modification system at least permits the user to change contrast, 
foreground and background colors, fonts, and font size, with options for multiple 
font sizes or zoom magnification. Systems such as the Sequoia Edge II and ES&S 
iVotronic are not accessible for many people with astigmatism, colorblindness or other 
visual impairments because they do not provide for contrast control or foreground-
background color selection. 
Contrast control allows for adjustment of the display’s contrast sharpness, while color 
selection allows a person to change from the default black text on a white background 
to white text on a black background or some other color combination. 
Here also, there is no good reason for these voting systems not to fully include this 
enhanced video presentation technology. 
5.7 Lack of Accommodation for Voters Who are Deaf-Blind
The access functions of the currently available electronic voting systems are also not 
suitable for providing accessible voting to people who have both profound hearing 
impairments and visual impairments. The lack of a standard output interface port 
means that, for example, most voters who are deaf-blind cannot use standard braille 
display devices, connected through standard serial interfaces, to read the instruction 
materials and then mark, review and correct their ballots privately and independently. 
Because of the high cost of braille displays (typically $3,000 or higher) the only current 
cost-effective way to accommodate independent and private access for voters who 
are profoundly deaf and blind is with a tactile ballot that has braille instructions and a 
vibrating verification wand or mark sensor. 
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6. Protection From Eavesdropping
Because many voters with low vision would like to use large, clear text on the screen 
and may have difficulty detecting eavesdroppers, the lack of a privacy curtain enclosing 
the booth area (not just token side panels), appears to be a serious or even totally 
unacceptable privacy breach. The side privacy panels of voting systems such as the 
Diebold AccuVote TSX, Sequoia Edge II, and ES&S iVotronic systems are inadequate for 
assuring privacy for all voters. The lack of privacy in the booth has been made worse by 
the addition of VVPAT printers beside the DRE voting machines. This makes it harder or 
impossible for the voter to shield the screen and printer display window with their body. 
The lack of a privacy curtain adequately enclosing the booth creates an unacceptable 
exposure, in violation of constitutional privacy requirements. 
7. VVPAT Printouts Are Not Accessible to Many People with Disabilities
When attempting to read the output of the voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) 
printers currently deployed on some DREs, voters with low vision can achieve useful 
magnification of the printout only through external lenses. For nonvisual readers and 
for voters whose impairments prevent them from positioning themselves close enough 
to the VVPAT printer view window to read the printout, verifying votes on the printout 
is not possible. Using the audio read-back feature of the DRE to confirm their electronic 
ballot marking in the DRE does not allow them to verify that their vote was recorded 
properly on the VVPAT printouts. 
For example, the ES&S iVotronic voting system provides a VVPAT by means of a printer 
on each device that records on a rolling paper scroll the selections of voters, one 
selection at a time, in real time, as each of the selections is made. Voters are forced to 
verify their votes on the audit trail by viewing the printout on the paper scroll through a 
small “audit log window” on the printer. 
The ES&S iVotronic VVPAT, however, is not adaptable for, nor usable by, many people 
with visual or motor impairments. Voters who are blind cannot read the printout at all, 
and other people with visual impairments might be able to read the paper only with the 
assistance of external lenses. Verification is also not possible for many voters with motor 
disabilities (those who use wheelchairs, for example) who cannot position themselves 
close enough to the printer’s audit log window to read the printout. 
Because these DRE systems lack a VVPAT that all voters with visual or motor impairments 
can use, they do not afford the same opportunity for access and participation (including 
privacy and independence) as for other voters on these voting systems. Instead, 
the electronic voting machines give voters without visual or motor impairments a 
verification feature not made accessible to all voters with visual or motor impairments. 
In the case of systems such as the Diebold AccuVote TSX, verification of the printout 
is also not possible when the tablet portion of the machine is removed from the base, 
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for example, to place it in a voter’s lap or to take it outside for “curbside” voting in an 
automobile.
The VVPATs are really not accessible for most of the voters with disabilities or special 
needs. And voters with disabilities are more likely to have these DRE voting systems 
misrepresent their vote, accidentally or maliciously, so they have even greater need than 
others to verify the audit record. 
When DRE representatives or advocates attempt to justify the lack of fully accessible 
VVPAT printouts by saying that it isn’t important or doesn’t matter because “other 
voting-system vendors don’t have it,” they are simply wrong. Adaptive technology to 
provide accessible VVPAT verification for voters with visual or motor impairments is 
available, and systems such as the AutoMARK and Populex electronic BMDs and tactile 
ballot aids such as Vote-PAD and Equalivote are able to provide accessible verification 
with standard paper ballots. 
The failure of the DRE voting systems to include accessible voter-verifiable paper record 
technologies cannot be justified. 
8. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, most DRE systems, such as the Diebold AccuVote 
TSX, Sequoia Edge II and ES&S iVotronic, fall far short of meeting HAVA compliance 
standards. As some of the voting systems’ manufacturers have managed it, there 
appears to be no good reason that the manufacturers of these DRE voting machines 
could not have designed their voting systems with truly accessible technologies.
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Appendix D: Available and Well-Established Access 
Technologies 
1. Affordable Disability Access Technologies Are Readily Available
Omission of proper access capabilities from the current DRE voting systems cannot 
be attributed to impracticality of undue cost or unavailable technology. Adding the 
necessary switch-control inputs, alternative tactile-key controls, speech output and 
easy-to-read large-text display to electronic voting equipment does not have to entail 
major costs or great technology breakthroughs.
For more than 15 years, computer hardware and software have been successfully 
assisting people with a wide variety of disabilities to meaningfully communicate with 
and use computerized systems. Although not perfected and not implemented evenly 
across all possible applications, access technologies have made many computer systems 
reasonably accessible for many people with disabilities. This is especially true in the case 
of access to personal computers.
2. Blindness or Low Vision
Many voters who are visually impaired can now regularly use large-text, speech and/or 
braille interface systems on computers for word processing, e-mail and Web browsing.
For more than a decade, most personal computers have been able to speak to their 
users in a high-quality voice using only inexpensive software programs and standard 
built-in computer hardware.
Single-line braille displays (although costing several thousand dollars or more) have 
been used by many computer users who are blind for decades.
For more than 15 years, the standard built-in video hardware of personal computers has 
been powerful enough to allow screen magnifier programs to enlarge screen text and 
images, adjust contrast, and customize the colors used for text and background. 
3. Motor Impairment
For at least a decade, people with motor impairments and some keyboarding 
capabilities have been typing on their personal computers with the aid of software 
programs that adjust keyboard timing to prevent unwanted key presses or stuttering 
repeats. This type of keyboard access software also offers “sticky key” options to allow 
single-finger or mouth-stick entry of keystrokes that would normally require typing with 
two hands or multiple fingers.
For decades, there have been alternative input-control systems that allow users with 
severe motor impairments to input text and control computers with just a couple of 
special switches (like sip-and-puff switches, large “jelly” switches, foot switches, head-
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movement switches and eye-blink switches). Sip-and-puff switches are devices that can 
attach to a voting machine and allow the voter to indicate his or her choices by sipping 
air from or puffing air into a tube. Jelly switches are large buttons that are easy for a 
person with limited hand strength and dexterity to press. Most of these switch input 
systems use the standard 1/8-inch phone plug for their common interface. 
Today, many voters with motor impairments have sophisticated computerized 
wheelchairs with built-in accessible communications systems that allow their users to 
send text messages and control signals to other computer systems. Head-mounted laser 
pointers, eye-gaze input systems, lap-tray puck-sensor systems and voice-recognition 
systems are just a few of the many alternative input and control systems that have been 
in common use for decades. 
4. Hearing Impairment
To aid users with hearing impairments, properly designed personal computer systems 
have, for many years, been able to route warning beeps through their sound systems 
and to redundantly indicate audible warning sounds, prompts and messages with visual 
flashes, captions or other visible cues.
This is not to say that all computer systems are completely accessible by all people 
with disabilities. Rather, it is to demonstrate that many good, inexpensive and mature 
access technologies have long been well known and readily available for computerized 
equipment designers to use in the design of equipment such as accessible electronic 
voting systems.
5. Voting Systems That Use the Available Technologies
Some voting systems incorporate many of the standard access technologies listed 
above, either singly or in combination. For example, the Hart InterCivic eSlate DRE and 
AutoMark BMD both allow alternative input controls with dual-switch devices, and the 
AutoMark and some of the tactile ballot systems produce printed paper ballots that can 
be accessibly verified privately by voters with disabilities.
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Appendix E: Some Suggestions for Improving Access on 
Current Systems
Meeting the new VVSG accessibility requirements would go a long way toward 
improving the accessibility of all voting systems for a broader range of voters with 
various disabilities.
The following are some simple human-factors suggestions that, although they may also 
be in the VVSG, are listed here because they have been repeatedly neglected in the 
design of several of the current electronic voting systems.
The proper operation of the system by the voter should be highly 
discoverable. This means that a voter should be able to figure out how to use 
the system without previous training and without significant instruction by a 
poll worker. 
Voting machines should have an audio key identification feature, such 
as holding the Help key down while pressing any other key to produce a 
message describing its function. 
There should be a practice mode with a simplified example mini ballot to 
give voters a chance to figure out how to view, mark, review and correct their 
choices.
There should be a “request assistance” button or other control to discretely 
summon assistance from a poll worker.
If the accessible ballot-marking procedure were properly designed, there 
would be no need for the complexity of a separate accessible ballot review 
mode. It would be much easier to navigate the original ballot marking 
procedure again, listening to choice summary and status prompts without 
long-winded messages and awkward keystroke sequences.
Like the language-selection start-up menu on most of the systems, the 
choice of access output media and input controls should be available for 
private selection by the voter, rather than only by the poll workers.
A simple control should always be available to allow the voter to turn the 
visual display on or off (with appropriate spoken indication of its status). 
This is important for preventing eavesdropping and for allowing a chosen 
assistant to read the screen and provide help.
An option for synchronized simultaneous audio and video output is 
essential for many voters with visual impairments, dyslexia, special language 
requirements or other needs.
Zoom, font-size, contrast and color display controls should be available and 
voter-adjustable throughout the voting process, not just at the beginning. 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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 The system should default by starting each voter’s session at a normal 
volume and speech rate.
 Audio volume and speech rate controls should be built in and available at 
all times for adjustment by the audio voter.
 Normalization of the volume of all audio messages is very important, for 
both factory built-in messages and locally generated messages. This keeps 
the volume output reasonably constant so the voter does not miss quiet 
messages or have to keep adjusting the volume setting.
 Speech rate should be controlled with Variable Speed Control (VSC) 
or other methods that do not result in “chipmunk” distortion. The current 
Sequoia Edge II has an improperly implemented speech rate control that 
causes chipmunk distortion and does not significantly increase the speed 
with which the voter can read through the ballot.
 For audio voters with assistive hearing needs, support for both neck loop 
hearing aids and boosted volume levels should be available.
 For audio access systems that use recorded human messages (in contrast 
to synthetic speech), it is important that messages be recorded by native 
speakers who are trained in proper recording techniques and using good-
quality recording equipment.
 When text-to-speech (TTS) software is used to generate spoken messages 
for audio access, the highest-quality TTS voices should be used. Many elderly 
voters find that it is difficult to understand and takes a long time (days to 
weeks, not just minutes) to adjust to some of the lower-quality TTS voices 
that some voting systems have been using. It is not wise to count on the 
judgment of younger voters who use computers with speech output every 
day when attempting to assess the acceptability of a TTS system for use by 
elderly voters.
 Voting systems using synthetic text -to speech should include a 
pronunciation-exceptions dictionary or other method for elections officials to 
correct mispronunciations.
 There should be controls to allow the audio voter to pause, continue and 
repeat audio messages.
 Buttons that are used to move forward or backward in an audio ballot 
should have shapes that indicate direction (for example, arrow-shaped keys 
that intuitively indicate their direction for moving through the ballot choices). 
It is cognitively much easier to use tactile controls with up and down arrow 
keys to move within a contest and to have left and right arrows to move 
backward and forward through the races (as if they were simply pages of a 
book).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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 For cognitive simplification, each race should be displayed on a separate 
screen in a simple linear format without multiple columns (whenever 
possible).
 Multilevel, hierarchical menus should be avoided, as they are unnecessarily 
challenging for voters who have cognitive impairments or use audio access. It 
is much better to use simpler linear menus or lists.
 The touch screen systems should ignore jittery touches that last less than 
0.75 seconds. 
 Any simultaneous secondary screen contact (such as by the palm or other 
fingers) should be ignored. 
 Having long fingernails should not prevent a user from reliably making 
selections on the touch screen.
 Slide-in selection on a touch screen should be accepted without causing 
problems.
 Blinking, pulsating or bright lights on a display should be avoided, as some 
voters with certain nervous conditions may tend to react negatively with 
sudden migraine headaches, seizures or other problems. 
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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